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INTRODUCTION
Approximately twenty-five years ago, Professor Richard
Lempert, reflecting on the then-current state of evidence scholarship,
noted a dramatic shift underway.' He described what had become a
largely "moribund" field giving way to a burgeoning "new evidence
scholarship." 2 The scholarship in the moribund phase employed "a
timid kind of deconstructionism with no overarching critical theory,"
was "seldom interesting," and any "potential utility" was "rarely
realized"; Lempert proposed the following mock article title as a model
representing the genre: "What's Wrong with the Twenty-Ninth
Exception to the Hearsay Rule and How the Addition of Three Words
Can Correct the Problem." 3 By contrast, the "new evidence
scholarship" was moving from merely interpreting rules to "analyzing
the process of proof' and drawing insights from "mathematics,
1.

Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship:Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66

B.U. L. REV. 439, 439-77 (1986).
2.
The "moribund" nature of the field developed after the "great systematizers of the
common law" (Wigmore, Maguire, McCormick, and Morgan). Id. at 439. In describing the thencurrent work as the "new evidence scholarship," Lempert also coined the phrase that would come
to define this collective body of work. See Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship
Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 984-85 (2006) ("The
term 'New Evidence Scholarship' coined by Richard Lempert is broad enough to cover all
interdisciplinary scholarship or even all innovative scholarship. But the term has most often
been applied to scholarship on probability and proof, including evidence scholarship that applies
formal tools of probability theory, such as Bayes' Theorem."). The new evidence scholarship
revived theoretical projects anticipated by the late greats Bentham, Thayer, and Wigmore in
exploring the philosophical foundations of evidence law. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, WORKS VI, at 7-20 (John
Bowring ed., 2002) (1843); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT
THE COMMON LAW vi-viii (1898); WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND

WIGMORE 1-4 (1985) (explaining how Bentham and others laid the foundation for evidence
scholarship); JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 1-4 (1913).

3.
Lempert, supra note 1, at 439; see also id. at n.1 ("This title not only suggests the focus
of the type of scholarship I am thinking about but also typifies it in length and lack of grace.").
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psychology and philosophy." 4 To be clear, the new evidence scholarship
still focused to a large extent on rules, but it provided more robust
analysis in light of the legal proof process and its underlying goalsmost significantly, the goals of fostering accurate outcomes, avoiding
factual errors, and allocating the risk of error in a fair and justified
manner.
The "new evidence scholarship" is no longer new. The
burgeoning field described in Lempert's classic article produced an
explosion of diverse theoretical and empirical work on the evidentiary
proof process. 5 On the theoretical side, many scholars continue to
utilize "mathematical models as modes of proof or as a means of
understanding trial processes." 6 Here is an illustrative sample of
issues on which current scholarship focuses:
(1) the desirability of basing legal judgments on explicitly
statistical evidence; 7
4.
Id. at 439-40.
5.
The symposium in which Lempert's article appeared marks an important phase in the
literature, 66 B.U. L. REV. 377-952 (1986) ("Symposium: Probability and Inference in the Law of
Evidence"), as does a subsequent symposium in 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 253-1075 (1991)
("Symposium: Decision and Inference in Litigation"). Earlier related articles analyzing the
process of proof include: Vaughn Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards
of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 807-08 (1961); Alan D. Cullison, ProbabilityAnalysis of Judicial
Fact-Finding:A Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach, 1 U. TOL. L. REV. 538, 538-40
(1969) (examining probability analysis in the context of proof; Michael 0. Finkelstein & William
B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490 (1970)
(same); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the FactfindingProcess, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 106570 (1968); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On JudicialProof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1357-60 (1985); Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1329-31 (1971) (analyzing
proof in the context of mathematics). In addition to the projects by Bentham, Thayer, and
Wigmore, supra note 2, another early precursor is J.R. GULSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROOF: IN
ITS RELATION TO THE ENGLISH LAW OF JUDICIAL PROOF v-ix (1905).
Lempert, supra note 1, at 440. For a brief overview of the literature, see D. Michael
6.
Risinger, Introduction: Bayes Wars Redivivus-An Exchange, 8 INT'L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 1,
1-41 (2010).
Compare Tribe, supra note 5, at 1350 (noting that the mere fact that mathematics
7.
"taken alone can rarely, if ever, establish [guilt] . . . does not imply that such evidence-when
properly combined with other, more conventional evidence in the same case-cannot supply a
useful link in the process of proof' (emphasis in original)), with Finkelstein & Fairley, supranote
5, at 490, 517 (arguing that mathematics should never be used alone to determine guilt or
innocence, but that Bayes' Theorem used in conjunction with other incriminating evidence can be
used to "lead to a fairer evaluation of identification evidence"). This issue has taken on more
significance with the possibility of "cold hit" DNA cases, in which the "random match" probability
of a DNA match (i.e., the likelihood that a DNA sample came from another random member of
the population) is the only incriminating evidence against a defendant. See David H. Kaye,
Rounding up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis of DNA Trawling Cases, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 425, 425-27 (2009) (noting that the issue of "DNA trawling" has become a more "urgent"
question with the development of DNA databases containing "more than six million profiles from
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(2) the feasibility of introducing statistical evidence or formal
techniques into the proof process;8
(3) defining fundamental concepts such as relevance and
probative value in probabilistic terms; 9
(4) quantifying the probative value of particular items of
evidence;10
(5) explaining, justifying, or critiquing particular rules of
evidence;"
(6) explaining, justifying, or critiquing standards of proof;12
and
convicted offenders and suspects"); Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone
is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1130-35 (2010) (arguing that courts should adopt a
numerical threshold in "cold hit" cases); Montgomery Slatkin, Yun S. Song & Erin Murphy, The

Probabilitythat a "Cold Hit" in a DNA DatabaseSearch Results in an Erroneous Attribution, 54
J. FORENSIC Sci. 22, 22-25 (2009).

8.

See Craig R. Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian

Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L.J. 1, 10-24 (1982) (discussing problems of computational
complexity); Dale A Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An

Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small
Random Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 395-98 (2005) (arguing that Bayesian
presentations may improve juror understanding of DNA evidence).

9.

See David H. Kaye, The Relevance of "Matching"DNA- Is the Window Half Open or

Half Shut?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 676, 683-84 (1995) ("The best developed and most
plausible theory of probative value builds on a statistical concept known as the likelihood ratio.");
Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1977) ("Where the
likelihood ratio for an item of evidence differs from one, that evidence is logically relevant. This is
the mathematical equivalent of... 'relevant evidence' ....
).
10. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of
MathematicalModels of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 108-09 (2007) (surveying attempts to
quantify probative value); supra note 9.

11.

See Richard D. Friedman, CharacterImpeachment Evidence: Psycho-BayesianAnalysis

and a ProposedOverhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 655-66 (1991) (critiquing character rules based
on probabilistic analysis); Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96
YALE L.J. 667, 690-729 (1987) (analyzing hearsay in probabilistic terms).

12.

See Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme

Court's Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 557-59 (1987)
(arguing that "the Court's reasoning about both [elements underlying its logic on burden of proof
jurisprudence] has been deficient"); Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof,
YALE L.J. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087254 (reconceptualizing the
"preponderance standard as a probability ratio"); Cullison, supra note 5; Michael L. DeKay, The

Difference Between Blackstone-Like ErrorRatios and ProbabilisticStandards of Proof, 21 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 125, 125-26 (1996); David Hamer, Probabilistic Standards of Proof, Their

Complements and the Errors that Are Expected to Flow from Them, 1 U. NEW ENG. L.J. 71, 72-74
(2007); Kaplan, supra note 5; D.H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian
Decision Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 1, 1-4 (1999) (explaining
Bayesian rules in the context of proof); Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for

Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159 (1983);
Fredrick E. Vars, Toward a General Theory of Standards of Proof, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 2-4
(2010).
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(7) analyzing the various "proof paradoxes" (for example, "Blue
Bus," "Gatecrashers," and "Prisoners in the Yard"), in which outcomes
implied by a probabilistic conception of the proof process appear to
clash with judgments about what the proper outcomes should be.13
This scholarship informs philosophical work exploring the
epistemological and moral foundations of evidence law and legal
proof,14 as well as law-and-economics-inspired work examining the
possible effects of evidence, evidentiary rules, and legal proof on
primary (i.e., nonlitigation) behavior.15
13. For an overview of the literature, see Mike Redmayne, Exploring the Proof Paradoxes,
14 LEGAL THEORY 281 (2008). For a recent philosophical discussion, see David Enoch, Levi

Spectre & Talia Fisher, Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge, 30
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 197 (2012).
14. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 3-9 (2001); LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH,
ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 1-9 (2006) (arguing that,
"whatever else it is, a criminal trial is first and foremost an epistemic engine"); ALEX STEIN,
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAw 1-11 (2005); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized
Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1491-93 (2001); Amalia Amaya,

Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Fact-Finding, 5 EPISTEME 306-09
(2008) (arguing for a greater role for epistemology in evidence law); Scott Brewer, Scientific
Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1538-42 (1998) (exploring
the role of scientific experts in evidence law from an epistemological perspective); Alvin I.
Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 237, 237-40
(2002) (exploring the intersection of Bayesianism and evidence law); Michael S. Pardo, The Field
of Evidence and the Field of Knowledge, 24 LAW & PHIL. 321, 321-24 (2005); Michael S. Pardo &
Ronald J. Allen, JuridicalProofand the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 224-25 (2008)
(arguing that "the relative neglect of explanation-based reasoning," relative to a focus on
probability theories, "has been a mistake"); Frederick Schauer, In Defense of Rule-Based
Evidence Law-And Epistemology Too, 5 EPISTEME 295, 295-96 (2008); see also Paul Roberts,

Groundwork for a Jurisprudence of Criminal Procedure, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAw 379, 387-94 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (discussing "epistemological
perspectives on evidence and proof" and concluding "this is one of the most vibrant and
productive chapters of Evidence scholarship in recent years").

15.

See Dan M. Kahan, The Economics-Conventional, Behavioral, and Political-of

"Subsequent Remedial Measure" Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1616, 1616-19 (2010) (criticizing
the economic justifications for the "ban on proof of 'subsequent remedial measures' "); Louis
Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 741-52 (2012) (exploring the burden of proof from a
social-welfare perspective); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of
Evidence on PrimaryBehavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 519-24 (2010) (arguing that "evidentiary
motivations will often lead actors to engage in socially suboptimal behavior . . . to generate
evidence that can later be presented in court and will increase their chances of winning the
case"); Chris William Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. 273, 273-77 (2008) (exploring evidence law as a tool to influence behavior rather than
simply find truth); Chris William Sanchirico, CharacterEvidence and the Object of Trial, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1228, 1229-39 (2001) (arguing that character evidence rules can only be
analyzed in a context where trials are just one part of a state's efforts to regulate the behavior of
individuals); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 816-22 (2006) (examining economic efficiency in contract law via the lens of
standards of proof). The scholarship outlined above has also inspired nascent work on artificial
intelligence ("AI") and law. See DOUGLAS WALTON, WITNESS TESTIMONY EVIDENCE:
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On the empirical side, a robust literature provides a powerful
psychological model of the behavior of legal fact finders in general and
evidence on a host of specific evidentiary issues.16 The well-confirmed
model of jury behavior-the Story Model-posits that legal fact finders
assimilate evidence into competing narratives of the events and select
the most plausible or satisfying of the available accounts.17 In addition
to the general model, the literature presents a variety of claims about
the behavior of juries and judges regarding specific types of evidence,
instructions, scenarios, or influences, 18 and it sheds some light on the
effects that rules regulating evidence such as hearsay, expert
testimony, and prior convictions appear to have in actual cases.19 The
ARGUMENTATION, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND LAW 1-11 (2008) (surveying AI models of legal

evidence).
16. For overviews of the literature on juries, see NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS,
AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 15-21 (2007) (describing the effectiveness of the American jury
system); Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 717, 717-22 (2006) (examining myths and realities of jury trials). On judges as fact
finders, see Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the JudicialMind,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 (2001) (exploring the decisionmaking processes judges employ);
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of DeliberatelyDisregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1330-31 (2005)
(arguing that a judge's ability to disregard evidence deemed inadmissible is limited); see also
Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165,
165-86 (2006) (discussing the need for evidentiary rules to guide and constrain judicial
decisionmaking on factual issues).
17. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 16, at 135 ("Many subsequent studies .. . have lent
support to the basic assumptions of the story model."); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A
Cognitive Model of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 519-20
(1991) (analyzing the Story Model). In presenting the Story Model, Pennington and Hastie
contrast it with probability models and argue convincingly that it provides a better descriptive
account of the cognitive processes of jurors. Pennington & Hastie, supra, at 519-20. A distinction
between stories and probability theory continues to dominate scholarly discussions of evidence
and trials; however, for the reasons discussed below, this distinction is problematic and based on
a false theoretical dichotomy. See infra Part I.C.
18. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to Make
DNA-Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1300 (2001)
(detailing the behavior of attorneys and juries regarding DNA evidence); Michael J. Saks &
Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 L. &
SOC'Y REV. 123, 123-26 (1980-81) (discussing cognitive psychology and legal fact-finding); David
Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029106 (discussing the empirical literature on jury
instructions); see also VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 16 (surveying the literature).
19. See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 471-75 (2005) (arguing that the
difference between the Daubert and Frye scientific admissibility tests is negligible in the course
of a trial); Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The DevastatingImpact of Prior Crimes Evidence
and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 493-97
(2011) (asserting that "prior criminal convictions weigh heavily in jurors' decisions about
acquittal and conviction" but that "jurors' learning . . . that defendant has been convicted of prior
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relationships between the theoretical literature and the issues
explored in the empirical literature raise additional theoretical,
practical, and empirical questions. 20
This Article takes up the theoretical project writ large.
Exploring the landscape of evidence scholarship, the Article examines
a number of methodological and metatheoretical questions: What
would a successful evidentiary theory look like? By what criteria
ought we assess such a theory? What is the purpose of such
theorizing? What is the relationship between the theoretical and
empirical projects? In exploring these questions, the Article identifies
theoretical criteria by which any theory of the evidentiary proof
process (or aspects of the process) may be evaluated. 21
Although the discussion will be theoretical, its practical
significance is real and far reaching. The skeptic might ask, "Why,
from a practical perspective, do we need evidence theories in the first
place?" We need them for three distinct reasons. 22 First, any
application by judges of evidentiary concepts-and the rules and
standards that contain these concepts-will presuppose some
conception of what the concepts mean and what is required by the
rules and standards. 23 For example, any determination or evaluation
crimes makes very little difference in conviction rates"); Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at

Work: Has it Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473, 473-77

(1992).
20. For example, what is the relationship between the Story Model and burdens and
standards of proof? What normative implications follow from their interaction? See Kevin M.
Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L. REV. 469, 469-71 (2009) (discussing possible
relationships between the Story Model and probabilistic standards of proof); Lisa Kern Griffin,
Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281 (2013) (discussing potential ways to improve
accuracy in criminal trials in light of the Story Model); Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE

803(3), and Criminal Defendants' Post-Crime State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REV.

975, 975-76 (2008) (analyzing hearsay in light of the Story Model).
By "evidentiary proof process," I mean the legal procedures by which parties use
21.
evidence to prove or disprove material facts. These procedures regulate the process of proof at
trial as well as at various pre- and posttrial proceedings (for example, at a pretrial hearing or at
sentencing) in which parties present evidence and legal decisionmakers conclude whether a
particular standard of proof has been met.
22. In addition to these three reasons, Peter Tillers explores a number of other ways in
which evidentiary theories may contribute to our understanding of legal proof. Peter Tillers,
Trial by Mathematics-Reconsidered,10 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 167, 172 (2011).
23. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 167,
180-87 (1956) (discussing the concept-conception distinction). General concepts may be conceived
of in different ways (i.e., different conceptions), and disagreements may emerge as to the best
way to characterize the general concepts. For example, epistemologists offer different conceptions
of the general concept of "knowledge," and moral, legal, and political philosophers offer different
conceptions of the general concept of "justice." For a general overview, see Lawrence B. Solum,

Legal Theory Lexicon 028: Concepts and Conceptions, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 29, 2012),
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheoryjexicon/2004/03/legal

theorylel.html. Evidence theory

554

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2:547

of whether an item of evidence is relevant (the evidentiary concept)
will depend on some conception or understanding of what it means for
evidence to be "relevant" in the first place. Without some conception,
the concepts (and the rules and standards that employ the concepts)
could not guide particular applications, nor could particular
applications be evaluated in light of what is required by the rules and
standards. Moreover, there may be more than one conception for many
evidentiary concepts.
Second, the proof process provides a forum through which the
law enforces the rights, duties, and obligations flowing from
substantive areas of law. Applications in this process-including both
rulings by judges on the admissibility of particular items of evidence
and judgments by fact finders on whether the evidence as a whole
proves a particular fact-may be principled, coherent, and justified, or
they may be left to the subjective whims of individual decisionmakers.
If the latter is the case, then is it not clear why we even have law on
these issues at all. 24 Of course, even "untheorized" trial practices may
ultimately turn out to be good ones, but evidence theory nevertheless
makes explicit what is implicit in these practices, so that we can
better examine, evaluate, critique, and perhaps improve them.
Third, the practical significance of evidence theory extends well
beyond trials. The issues at stake affect doctrinal issues in criminal
and civil litigation more generally in critical, and underappreciated,
ways. The evidentiary rules and standards also determine important
issues such as who gets to trial in the first place, which verdicts will
be allowed to stand, and which convictions will be overturned. For
example, summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law (civil
cases) and challenges by defendants to sufficiency of the evidence
(criminal cases) each turn on what fact finders could reasonably infer

also involves differing conceptions of key concepts such as "relevance," "probative value," and
"evidential sufficiency." See infra note 116.
24. This is not to suggest that subjective decisions cannot be principled, coherent, justified,
or correct. The key point is that purely subjective standards would cease to be standards in any
meaningful sense, and the enforcement of substantive law under such a regime would depend on
the subjective beliefs of decisionmakers and not on the principled application of generally
applicable legal standards. In analyzing the disarray in English courts on standards of proof,
Mike Redmayne expresses similar sentiments:
Whatever the nature of the process of proof in legal fact finding, we need some basis
for understanding why we have standardsof proof and why we may wish to vary them
in different adjudicative contexts. The price English law has paid for ignoring this is
clear: a confused and inconsistent case law.
Mike Redmayne, Standardsof Proofin Civil Litigation, 62 MOD. L. REV. 167, 194-95 (1999).
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from the evidence in light of the applicable evidentiary standards. 25 In
an era of "vanishing trials" on the civil side 26 and the attention to and
concern with false convictions on the criminal side,27 these practical
doctrinal issues may be as important as any facing the law today.
They depend, at root, on a satisfactory account of evidence and proofin other words, on evidence theory.28
The Article proceeds in three main Parts. Part I provides
general criteria for evaluating evidence theory, and Parts II and III
apply the criteria to current theoretical accounts in evidence
scholarship. The metatheoretical discussion in Part I contributes to
the theoretical literature regardless of whether one accepts the
specific applications and conclusions reached in Parts II and III. For
this reason, it may be the most important Part of the Article.
Part I explores the nature of theoretical accounts of evidence
and proof and the purposes of this theorizing. The discussion begins by
isolating an "epistemological core" of procedural considerations at the
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment), FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (judgment as a matter of
law); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50 (2000) (explaining that
the standard for judgment as a matter of law "mirrors" the standard for summary judgment);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986) (explaining the summary
judgment standard as whether "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party" and that this determination depends on the "evidentiary standard of proof' at trial);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) (articulating sufficiency standard in criminal cases
as whether "any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"). The
evidentiary rules also set directions for discovery.
26. See Marc Galantar, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004) (documenting

decreases in rates of civil trials). Diminishing trials are also a concern on the criminal side. See
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689, 69193 (2004).
27.

See Brandon Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56-62 (2008)

(examining the cases of the first two hundred individuals exonerated by postconviction DNA
testing). Along with regulating trial outcomes and sufficiency review in criminal cases, the
evidentiary rules also influence plea bargaining (and thus affect false convictions that result
from pleas), although so do several other factors. See Stephanos Bibas, PleaBargainingOutside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470-96 (2004) (discussing the nonevidentiary
factors that affect plea bargaining).

28. For detailed discussions of how issues in civil and criminal procedure depend on
evidence law, see Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil
Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1454-1508 (2010) [hereinafter Pardo, Pleadings] (describing
how pleadings, summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law relate to the civil litigation
system and the evidentiary proof process); Michael S. Pardo, Second-OrderProof Rules, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 1083, 1085-1113 (2009) [hereinafter Pardo, Second-Order] (arguing that proof rules fail
to serve their purported goal in minimizing errors in allocation and proposing "second-order"
proof rules). For a more recent effort to link pleadings, summary judgment, and burdens of proof
in terms of the costs and benefits of deterring harmful conduct and chilling benign conduct, see
Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper 12-41), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154683.
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foundation of the law of evidence: (1) factual accuracy and (2)
allocating the risk of factual errors.29 This Part argues that evidence
theory must account for these foundational considerations and further
argues that a failure to do so is a defect for any theory. 30 Thus,
whatever its other features, the nature of evidence theory includes this
epistemological core. 31 The purposes of theoretical accounts of evidence
and proof fall into two main categories. 32 Theories may be descriptive
or explanatory (positive theories), 33 on the one hand, or they may be
normative theories, on the other. Theories in the second category
purport to provide accounts for correct applications and outcomes. 34
Whichever of these purposes an evidentiary theory is meant to serve,
the theory must provide or rely upon a satisfactory account of the
epistemological core. A descriptive or explanatory theory that fails to
account for these foundational considerations fails as a description or
explanation of the proof process; a normative theory that provides an
implausible account of this core is not one by which we should judge
our current practices.
Part I then identifies three theoretical criteria that a successful
evidentiary theory ought to meet. These criteria form the heart of the
Article and drive the subsequent analysis. First, the theory must
explain, or otherwise rely upon, a satisfactory account of the relevance
and probative value of individual items of evidence. This constraint
arises at the "micro-level" of proof and underlies the admissibility and
29. These considerations are recognized as the primary criteria for formulating proof
doctrine and for determining constitutional due process requirements regarding standards of
proof. See infra note 47.
30. The law in any particular doctrinal area is the result of many different actors pursuing
different goals and purposes. It is, of course, not the result of a single mind with focused
intentions. Positing particular goals or functions for an area of law is thus open to the potential
objections of oversimplifying and perhaps anthropomorphizing legal doctrine. Aware of these
pitfalls, the discussion in Part I explains why these considerations are nevertheless foundational
in the law of evidence.
31. Sometimes these considerations will be at the forefront of theorizing, and sometimes
they will be presupposed by it.
32.
Cf. Lempert, supra note 1, at 441-48 (describing the purposes of mathematical models
of evidence to include "prescriptions for action," "normative models," and "descriptive models").
33. Theories in this category may describe how aspects of the process (e.g., a rule) operate
in practice, or they may explain how aspects of the process operate in terms of their goals, in
terms of other considerations (e.g., efficiency or deterrence), or in terms of underlying causal
mechanisms (e.g., psychological or sociological).
34. They may serve a variety of distinct normative roles: a regulative function by providing
guidance, a prescriptive function by providing reasons to change current practices, or an
evaluative function by providing a standard or criteria for assessment. See generally JUDITH
JARvIs THOMSON, NoRMATIVITY 2 (2009) (broadly discussing normative values and dividing them
into "directives" and "evaluatives").
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exclusion of evidence at trial.35 Second, the theory must either explain
or rely upon a satisfactory account of the various standards of proof.
This constraint arises at the "macro-level" of proof3 6 and underlies
both sufficiency of the evidence at trial and the various criminal and
civil procedure doctrines that depend on the standards of proof.3 7
Third, the theory must integrate its accounts at the micro- and macrolevels or otherwise rely upon on a plausible account of how these two
levels relate. Inconsistent accounts of the two levels, or a failure to
explain how they relate, generate theoretical and practical problems.38
The criteria are referred to as the (1) "micro-level constraint," (2)
"macro-level constraint," and (3) "integration constraint," respectively.
Part II applies the criteria to a probabilistic conception of
evidence and proof. According to this conception, contested
propositions are assessed according to their probability, given the
evidence, with such assessments conforming to the axioms or rules of
probability theory. 39 This Part argues that theoretical accounts of
evidence and proof that rely on a probabilistic conception fail in light
of all three criteria. First, the probabilistic conception fails
descriptively and normatively at the micro-level. In support of this
conclusion, this Part argues that evidence may be relevant even when
it does not distinguish probabilistically between the parties' claims,
and that a change in probability is neither necessary nor sufficient for
evidence to be relevant. Second, at the macro-level, probabilistic
standards of proof fail to fit with their underlying goals regarding
35. FED. R. EVID. 401-03.
36. The micro-macro distinction is meant simply as shorthand for proof issues that pertain
to individual items of evidence (admissibility questions), on one hand, and those that pertain to
the strength of evidence as a whole on particular issues (sufficiency questions), on the other.
Nothing more elaborate is implied by the labels.
37. See supra note 25.
38. On the theoretical side, an inconsistent theory cannot be true, and a theory that does
not explain the relationship is incomplete. On the practical side, both inconsistent and
incomplete theories fail to provide guidance in applying evidentiary rules. See infra notes 85-87
and accompanying text.
39. "Probability" in the text refers to the conventionally understood notions associated with
mathematical (or "Pascalian") probability-see infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text-not
to alternative, nonquantifiable notions of probability (i.e., ordinal, inductive, or causative)
associated with Francis Bacon, John Stuart Mill, and Jonathan Cohen. See L. JONATHAN COHEN,
THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 9-12 (1977) (discussing the distinctions between these

theories of probability); Alex Stein, The Flawed ProbabilisticFoundationof Law and Economics,
105 Nw. U. L. REV. 199, 202-07 (2011) (same). It also does not refer to an alternative conception
based on "fuzzy logic" that relaxes some of the assumptions of conventional probability theory.

See Kevin M. Clermont, Death of Paradox:The Killer Logic Beneath the Standards of Proof, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986346
(defending a "fuzzy logic" interpretation of proof standards).
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accuracy and the risk of error. This Part explains why probabilistic
standards shift too much of the risk of error and fail to foster accuracy
or provide criteria for evaluating applications. Third, regarding the
integration constraint, this Part explains why the only plausible
probabilistic accounts at the micro-level and the macro-level are
inconsistent with each other. 40 When combined with tensions at the
micro-level, the macro-level and integration constraints render the
probabilistic conception implausible.
Part III discusses an explanatory conception of evidence and
proof. According to this conception, contested propositions are
assessed according to how well, if true, they would explain the
evidence and events when compared with competing, contrastive
propositions.41 This Part argues that this conception fits with each of
the three theoretical criteria, explains how it avoids the conceptual
problems that inhere in the probabilistic conception, and responds to
several counterarguments. First, at the micro-level, relevance and
probative value depend on whether evidence forms part of, supports,
or challenges one of the explanations put forward by the parties. 42
Second, at the macro-level, standards of proof are expressed in terms
of explanatory criteria. The quality of an explanation needed to satisfy
a standard of proof varies depending on the applicable standard-for
example, the quality of an explanation needed to satisfy the
preponderance standard is lower than that needed to satisfy the clearand-convincing-evidence and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standards. 43
Third, the explanatory conception satisfies the integration constraint
because the micro- and macro-level accounts cohere in a
straightforward way. The same explanatory considerations that
elucidate relevance and probative value at the micro-level also
elucidate the standards of proof and evidential sufficiency at the
macro-level. 44
40. Discussions in the scholarly literature tend to focus on either micro-level or macro-level
proof issues, but not both, and thus the integration problem escapes notice. So far as I am aware,
this Article provides the first detailed discussion of the problem.
41. The explanatory conception is discussed in detail in Pardo & Allen, supra note 14. The
focus on explanatory criteria (or "inference to the best explanation," see infra notes 211-16)
provides an epistemological foundation for the "relative plausibility" theory developed previously
by Professor Allen. See Ronald J. Allen, FactualAmbiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U.
L. REV. 604, 606 (1994).
42. This conception accounts for relevant evidence that does not distinguish between the
parties' cases. See infra Part III.A.
43. This Part explains how explanatory standards of proof (1) fit with the goals of the
standards regarding accuracy and the risk of error and (2) provide guidance for evaluating
applications. See infra Part III.B.
44. See infra Part III. C.
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Finally, a brief Conclusion outlines some general lessons for
the projects of evidence theory.
I. EVIDENCE THEORY

Evidence theories provide conceptions or accounts of the
structure and nature of the evidentiary proof process. 45 Their scope
may include the proof process as a whole, or they may focus on a
particular aspect of the process (for example, a particular rule, type of
evidence, or type of reasoning). An evidence theory may aim to serve a
descriptive or an explanatory function, in which case its success
depends on how well it captures the underlying phenomena. An
evidence theory may also serve normative functions, including an
evaluative function by providing criteria for justifying or critiquing
particular judgments, and a regulative function by providing
considerations for guiding and constraining particular judgments. The
success of such theories depends on whether the outcomes they specify
or imply are justified in light of the goals of the proof process.
Moreover, to serve these normative roles, a theory must be one that
decisionmakers are capable of applying in practice.46
The evidentiary proof process may be evaluated based on two
considerations: (1) factual accuracy and (2) allocation among the
parties of the risk of factual errors. Any evidence theory-whether its
aims are descriptive, explanatory, or normative-will provide, rely
upon, or otherwise presuppose some account of how these
considerations relate to the process of proof. The considerations, which
are epistemological in nature, form a foundational core in the domain
of evidence theory. 47 For the reasons discussed below, this
45. See supranote 21.
46. Theories in this context must be able to describe, explain, guide, constrain, or evaluate
actual judgments and possible judgments that decisionmakers are capable of making. See Allen
& Leiter, supra note 14 (discussing "ought implies can" in epistemological theory). Although
there is theoretical value in theories of imaginative things or unrealizable ideals, the utility of
such theorizing is diminished in practical settings like legal proof where actual applications are
the proper object of theorizing. Compare, for example, a theory of balls and strikes in baseball
that could never be implemented or could never be used to tell whether an actual pitch was a ball
or strike.
47. This epistemological core forms the foundation of what William Twining has referred to
as "the Rationalist

Tradition" in evidence

scholarship. WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING

EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 33-91 (1st ed. 1990). The United States Supreme Court has
recognized both of these goals as foundational. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)
(risk of error); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1980) (factual accuracy);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-34 (1979) (risk of error); Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S.
406, 415-16 (1966) (factual accuracy).
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epistemological core provides a necessary (although not sufficient)
condition for a successful evidence theory. To be clear, this is not to
deny the significance of a host of other theoretical and practical issues
(moral, political, and economic) within the law of evidence.48 Rather,
the discussion below focuses on this epistemological core because it
provides a necessary step in constructing and evaluating an evidence
theory.
Why, exactly, is this epistemological core necessary? To answer
this question, we need to step back and look at procedural theory more
generally and the role of evidence law within litigation. The civil and
criminal procedural systems are animated by an array of procedural
values. These values include: accuracy, efficiency, participation,
respect for substantive rights, notice, predictability, fairness, equality,
and political legitimacy. 49 Each of these values provides a criterion by
which procedural theories may be evaluated.
The evidentiary process is the primary procedural location
where policies regarding accuracy and the risk-of-error allocation are
implemented. An evidentiary process that fails to implement these
policies fails to serve its procedural function, and a theory that fails to
account for how the law succeeds or fails at implementing these
policies likewise fails as a theory.50 This illustrates that this
epistemological core is a necessary part of the domain of evidence
theory, but why, exactly, is it foundational?
It is foundational because the other procedural values depend
on this core. An evidentiary process that fails in light of this core will
also fail to serve the other values, and a theory that cannot account for
this core will likewise fail in light of the other values. Consider, first,
factual accuracy. A theory of evidence that does not account for a
sufficient level of accuracy also cannot explain or account for other
procedural values. Specifically, an evidentiary process that delivered
systematically inaccurate outcomes would (1) be terribly inefficient;
(2) impose enormous costs on parties and society; (3) undermine notice
and participation rights; (4) create unpredictability; (5) fail to guide

48. For an overview of recent scholarship on these other issues, see Park & Saks, supra
note 2.
49. Although these values underlie both civil and criminal litigation, they are instantiated
differently given the interests at stake. Civil litigation is often animated by considerations of
equality, while criminal litigation is more often animated by respect for the rights of defendants.
50. A theory that succeeds in light of these goals may nevertheless fail in light of other
procedural values.
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and deter primary conduct; (6) violate substantive rights; and (7) very
quickly become politically illegitimate.51
Now, consider allocating the risk of error. In civil cases, this
consideration is aligned with the procedural values of fairness and
equality. 52 The evidentiary proof process purports to treat parties
equally with regard to the risk of error. The preponderance-of-theevidence standard of proof is employed for this purpose,53 and the
rules of evidence apply symmetrically among litigants. Thus, a theory
that fails to account for how the system allocates the risk of error in
this manner also fails in light of the procedural values of fairness and
equality. The criminal system, by contrast, purports to skew the risk
of error to a substantial degree away from criminal defendants. This
goal is manifested most obviously in the constitutionally required
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof, 5 4 but it also manifests
itself in evidence rules that apply asymmetrically among the parties. 55
51. Imagine a world in which litigation results in mostly erroneous judgments, and
consider what would follow. Citizens would have an incentive to file lawsuits regardless of the
underlying merits (indeed, particularly when they were not wronged). By contrast, citizens who
commit crimes and wrongs would win at trial. The result-at least initially-would be a great
deal more litigation in which costs are imposed on the legal system, innocent defendants who
lose, and injured plaintiffs who could not recover. Similar costs would arise in criminal cases,
with innocent defendants convicted and guilty ones acquitted. Rights to notice and participation
would become largely meaningless, because these rights are related to (although not reducible to)
accuracy considerations-parties need notice and the right to participate so that they can prove
or defend their cases on the merits. Moreover, without the realistic possibility of accurate trial
outcomes the substantive law would also become largely meaningless-conforming to the
dictates of the law would be no protection against losing at trial, and violating the dictates could
be done largely with impunity. Parties could not predict when they would be sued or prosecuted,
nor could citizens predict when their rights would be violated. It is not hard to imagine that, in
this dystopian world, legal judgments would soon fail to be legitimate, both descriptively (i.e.,
people would not perceive them as genuinely authoritative or as creating obligations) and
normatively (i.e., they would not satisfy minimal standards for acceptable or justified exercises of
political power that create genuine obligations). For a general overview of these two senses of
political legitimacy, see Fabienne Peter, Political Legitimacy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Apr. 29, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edulentries/legitimacy/.
52. See Ronald J. Allen, The Error of Expected Loss Minimization, 2 L., PROBABILITY &
RISK 1, 4 (2003) ("[E]qual treatment is incontrovertibly one critical component of fairness.");
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 237-73 (2004) (discussing the
values that contribute to fair procedure).
53. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (explaining that the preponderance
standard "results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error"); accord Herman & Maclean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (stating a preponderance standard "shares the risk of error
in roughly equal fashion"); see also Redmayne, supranote 24, at 171-74 (discussing the principle
of equality in civil cases).
54. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (giving defendants the option to introduce character
55.
evidence); FED. R. EVID. 410 (excluding evidence of statements made during failed plea
negotiations, unless defendants first introduce related statements).
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A theory that failed to explain or account for this risk-of-error
allocation would also fail in light of other procedural values, including
respect for the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
Accuracy and allocating the risk of error thus provide
foundational considerations in elucidating a successful theory of
evidence and proof. In what follows, this Part articulates theoretical
criteria in light of these considerations. The criteria focus on the two
primary aspects of proof-admissibility and sufficiency-and the
relationship
between
these
aspects.
The
epistemological
considerations aid in determining whether an evidence theory satisfies
a theoretical criterion. In other words, a theory aiming to describe or
explain an aspect of the process (e.g., the sufficiency of evidence to
meet a decision standard) should be able to describe or explain how
that aspect meets (or fails to meet) the system's goals regarding
accuracy and the risk of error. Similarly, a normative theory should be
able to explain why the theory would improve the system with regard
to accuracy or the risk of error, or why, if based on other normative
considerations (e.g., other procedural values), it would not lead to
undesirable epistemic consequences. After articulating the theoretical
criteria, this Part explains the relationships between the criteria and
the array of evidentiary rules, and it closes with a number of clarifying
assumptions.
A. Theoretical Criteria
A successful theory of evidence and proof must satisfy three
constraints.56 First, it must provide, or rely upon, a plausible account
of the relevance and probative value of individual items of evidence.
This is the micro-level constraint. Second, it must provide, or rely
upon, a plausible account of the standards of proof. This is the macrolevel constraint. Third, it must provide, or rely upon, a plausible
account of the relationship between the accounts at these two levels.
This is the integration constraint.
1. The Micro-Level Constraint
A theoretical account of evidence and proof should be able to
explain the relevance and probative value of evidence.57 The two
56. Although necessary, the constraints are not sufficient (individually or jointly). See
supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
57. FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevance); FED. R. EVID. 402 (excluding irrelevant
evidence).

2013]

NATURE AND PURPOSE OFEVIDENCE THEORY

563

fundamental tenets of modern evidence law are that (1) irrelevant
evidence ought to be excluded, and (2) relevant evidence ought to be
admitted, unless there is some good reason to exclude it.58 The
presuppositions underlying these tenets are that irrelevant evidence
will not contribute to a rational assessment of disputed factual issues
and that, all other things being equal, the addition of more relevant
evidence (properly understood and interpreted) will lead to a more
rational assessment of the disputed issues and thus more accurate
decisions.59 A satisfactory theory of evidence and proof ought to be
able to explain whether evidence is relevant, along with an
explanation why.6 0
A theory of evidence and proof will be potentially problematic if
the answers it provides or implies about the relevance of evidence fail
to accord with our considered judgments about the relevance of
evidence. Neither the theory nor particular judgments ought to
necessarily have priority, however, in every case. 6 ' If there is a
mismatch, then either (1) the theory is false or fails as a theoretical
account, or (2) the underlying judgments are false and ought to change
in light of the theory. In this context, the judgments ought to give way,
for example, if the outcomes provided or implied by a satisfactory
theory would better foster accuracy. Although it is thus possible for a

58. THAYER, supra note 2, at 264-66. Justifications for excluding relevant evidence are
discussed in Part I.B infra.
59. "Accuracy" refers to whether the outcomes match what actually happened, not merely
whether they are supported by the evidence. See Pardo, Pleadings, supra note 28, at 1470-71
(distinguishing the former as "material accuracy" and the latter as "procedural accuracy"). This
relationship between relevance and accuracy depends on proper interpretation by the
decisionmaker. Michael Risinger refers to this as the "god perspective" view of relevance, in
which the "inference maker knows all that is necessary to make as much accurate inference as
possible from any given item proposed for consideration, and has no time or processing capacity

constraints." D. Michael Risinger, Inquiry, Relevance, Rules of Exclusion, and Evidentiary
Reform, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (2010).
60. See supranote 46.
61. This relationship between particular judgments and general theories is consistent with
the idea of "reflective equilibrium" introduced by Nelson Goodman in discussing inferential rules,
NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 59-124 (4th ed. 1983), and made famous by
John Rawls in JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18-22, 46-53 (1971). Judgments about
particular cases, on one hand, and general rules, principles, or theories, on the other, are
gradually brought into agreement with each other by refining each in light of the other. For an
instructive overview of this process for Rawls, see John Mikhail, Rawls' Concept of Reflective
Equilibriumand its Original Function in A Theory of Justice, 3 WASH. U. JURIs. REV. 1 (2010).

See also Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and ConstitutionalMethod: Lessons from
John McCain and the Natural-Born Citizen Clause, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 246
(Huscroft & Miller eds., 2011) (essay "adapts the Rawlsian method of reflective equilibrium to
the constitutional domain").
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theory's implications to override particular judgments, 62 the initial
burden is on the proponent of a theory to explain why a considered
concrete judgment on an issue ought to give way to the dictates of an
abstract theory. Judgments about particular cases, in other words,
provide the starting point for theorizing; these judgments, however,
are defeasible and subject to revision in light of a compelling theory. 63
Similar theoretical and methodological considerations apply to
probative value. The probative value of evidence refers to the strength
of that evidence in proving a disputed factual proposition. Judgments
on probative value are highly contextual and depend not only on the
logical or empirical relationships between evidence and disputed
propositions, but also on the importance of the evidence; the party's
need for the evidence; the availability of other similar evidence; the
extent to which the issue is contested; and whether the other side has
introduced contrary evidence. 64 Probative value is a fundamental
consideration for the admissibility of evidence-judges may exclude
virtually any item of evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the potential dangers of unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, or misleading the jury, or for efficiency considerations (undue
delay, waste of time, or needlessly cumulative).65 Thus, any
satisfactory theory must contain a plausible explanation of the
probative value of individual items of evidence. Similarly, if there is a
mismatch between judgments about probative value and the answers
provided by a theory, the initial burden is on the proponent of the

62. This possibility is necessary for a theory to play any sort of normative role. In other
words, if the theory provides a standard for correct and incorrect judgments, then it must be
possible that some judgments are incorrect.
63. Why start with particular judgments? The short answer is that legal proof is a complex
social activity and thus is not likely capable of being captured fully by an abstract theory.
Therefore, a theory needs to provide compelling reasons to override judgments made by
experienced practitioners engaged in the practice, who are more likely (than theorists) to have
practical knowledge of what is required in particular situations even if that knowledge cannot be
articulated propositionally in a theory. For a defense of the primacy of particular judgments
along these lines, see BURNS, supra note 14. This assumption, however, is defeasible.
64. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182-83 (1997) (discussing the factors that
affect probative value).
65. FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that trial courts may exclude evidence if its probative
value is "substantially outweighed" by these countervailing considerations). But see FED. R. EVID.
609(a)(2) (dictating that prior convictions involving dishonest acts or false statements shall be
admitted for impeachment purposes). Probative value is also important at the macrolevel
because determinations of whether evidence is sufficient to satisfy a decision standard are
essentially determinations regarding what a reasonable jury could conclude about the probative
value of the evidence as a whole.
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theory to explain why evidence that appears to have low probative
value in fact has high probative value, or vice versa.66
2. The Macro-Level Constraint
A theory of evidence and proof must provide, or otherwise rely
upon, a plausible account of the nature and structure of proof at the
macro-level. Rather than focusing on individual items of evidence,
explanations at this level focus on whether micro-level evidence as a
whole satisfies a standard of proof-in other words, whether or not a
fact has indeed been "proven" for legal purposes.
At the macro-level, one party carries the burden of proof on
each litigated issue that forms an element of a civil claim, crime, or
affirmative defense. The burden of proof includes two components: a
burden of production and a burden of persuasion. The burden of
production is a function of the burden of persuasion-parties will have
satisfied a productionburden when they have presented evidence from
which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the burden of
persuasion has been satisfied.67 The burden of persuasion is
determined by the various proof standards: preponderance of the
evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable
doubt.68

66. See supra note 63.
67. The classic discussion of this relationship is John McNaughton, Burdens of Production
of Evidence: A Function of the Burden of Persuasion,68 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1383-85 (1955).
68. The standards apply to general categories of cases. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 757 (1982) (rejecting the process of determining the applicable proof standard on a case-bycase basis). On the wisdom of having three decision standards, see Kevin M. Clermont,
Procedure'sMagical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 1115, 1154-55 (1987) (explaining the cognitive limitations on more fine-grained
judgments). On the wisdom of the general winner-take-all approach to burdens of persuasion, as
opposed to proportional or fractional judgments, see David Kaye, The Limits of the
Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple
Causation, 7 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487, 514-16 (1982) (concluding if the most likely cause of
injury is "a legally responsible defendant," that defendant should be fully liable). Additional
complexities may arise when jurors accept the same outcome but disagree on the reasons; for an
illuminating discussion, see Peter Westen & Eric Ow, ReachingAgreement on When Jurors Must
Agree, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 153, 155-202 (2007) (analyzing the difficulties that arise when
jurors disagree on the means by which an offense was committed). I put aside this complexity in
the discussion to follow. For comparative perspectives of proof standards, compare Kevin M.
Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof,50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243,
244-74 (2002) (looking at differences between common law and civil law standards of proof and
concluding the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard should apply), with Michele Taruffo,
Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 659, 660-73 (2003) (critiquing the
Clermont and Sherwin article).

566

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2:547

The proof standards specify when evidence proves a particular
disputed fact. Considerations of accuracy and allocating the risk of
error animate the standards. Each consideration provides an
independent criterion by which to assess the acceptability of the
standards. For example, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
functions (or aims to function) to minimize errors and maximize
accuracy, other things being equal. 69 This follows from the fact that
decisions made under this standard favor the most likely alternative,
given the admitted evidence. 70 Assuming that evidence generally is a
good indicator of truth,7 ' decisions that appear more likely given the
evidence will be more accurate than decisions that appear less likely.72
The preponderance standard also allocates the risk of error roughly
equally among the parties (either side may have the less likely case
and the decision may be an error).73 Although this allocation is
acceptable in most civil cases because equality is a primary procedural

69. These functions also depend on other factors such as the distribution of truly deserving
plaintiffs and defendants who go to trial, the quality of the evidence and the parties' access to it,
and whether evidence is properly interpreted by fact finders.
70. See STEIN, supra note 14, at 143-44 (discussing the preponderance standard in light of
these considerations).
71. This assumption underlies having an evidentiary proof process in the first place. If
evidence does not bear this relation to truth, then dispute resolution should proceed in some
other manner.
72. Another way to perceive how the preponderance standard may minimize total errors is
to reflect on likely errors under higher or lower standards. But see supra note 69 and
accompanying text. When the standard is higher than a preponderance, there will be a class of
cases in which certain facts are more likely to be true than false, but they will be found to be "not
proven" because they do not reach the threshold for the higher standard. Because these facts are
more likely true than false, we would expect more errors than correct judgments in this class of
cases in the long run. Vice versa for a lower standard, except now the errors will result from
finding facts proven even when they are more likely false than true. Under the preponderance
standard, by contrast, we would expect more correct judgments than errors for these classes of
cases.
73. Either side may have the less likely case, and the decision may be an error, with cases
of evidential "ties" going against the party with the proof burden. See Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion
and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REv. 829, 833 (2012) (defending the policy of ties going to the
defendant on the ground that errors will seem more costly to defendants than to plaintiffs). See
generally Adam Samaha, Law's Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661, 1675-84 (2010) (discussing
the policies underlying tiebreaker rules).
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value, 74 this is generally deemed an unacceptable risk of error for
criminal defendants to bear for the elements of criminal offenses.75
A satisfactory theory ought to explain the proof standard in
light of these considerations. Successful explanations will include how
the standards allocate the risk of error. A satisfactory theory will also
explain how the standards relate to accuracy.76 Moreover, theories
ought to provide guidance for decisionmakers.77 Standards of proof are
instructions to judges and juries on how to arrive at judgments.
Correct application of the standards is thus the object of successful
theorizing. A theory that can explain formally how the standards fit
with their purported goals, but cannot explain how fact finders could
ever implement the standards consistent with the goals, fails as a
theory.78
A theory ought to also provide guidance in separating
"reasonable" from "unreasonable" applications. This important
doctrinal issue has, unfortunately, not been the subject of sustained
dialogue among proceduralists. 79 It is critical not only for proof at
trial; it arises throughout the civil and criminal litigation systems
more generally. On the civil side, the standards for summary
judgment before trial and judgment as a matter of law at or after trial
depend on whether a "reasonable" fact finder could find for the
nonmoving party.80 What is reasonable is a function of the evidence,

74. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) ("[T]he preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants."); Herman &
Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 391 (1983) (declining to depart from the preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard); Redmayne, supra note 24, at 171-74 (discussing the equality principle
and civil litigation).
75. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (expressing the constitutional goal of
reducing risk of errors where personal liberty is at stake in criminal cases); see also Addington v.
Texas, 411 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (explaining that the "clear and convincing" standard applies
when there are asymmetrical interests at stake in civil cases).
76. These explanations will include how the preponderance standard may maximize
accuracy, and how other standards may sacrifice accuracy. Total accuracy may be sacrificed
because cases proven by a preponderance of the evidence (but not to the higher standard) will go
against the party with the proof burden, even though that party's case is more likely to be
accurate.
77. See supra note 46.
78. How the standards ultimately operate in practice is a complex empirical question that
depends on a host of issues, including: the other evidentiary and procedural rules; the quality of
the evidence; the ability of fact finders to properly assess the evidence; and the distribution of
deserving parties on each side. It is not a defect of a theory that it cannot provide answers to
these empirical questions; rather, theories clarify the issues in need of further empirical
investigation.
79. See supra note 28.

80.

See supra note 25.
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the burden of proof, and the decision standard. For example, summary
judgment may depend on whether a reasonable fact finder could find
for the plaintiff on a particular issue (e.g., causation) by a
preponderance of the evidence. 81 This implies some understanding or
presupposition of what is required by the preponderance standard;
otherwise we could not distinguish between reasonable and
unreasonable applications. The same goes for judgment-as-a-matterof-law determinations. 8 2 Thus, whether parties get to trial in the first
place and whether particular verdicts are upheld depend on a
conception of the proof standard.
In criminal cases, likewise, whether evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction depends on whether a reasonable jury could find
the issues proven beyond a reasonable doubt.8 3 This determination
depends on a conception of what is required by the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard. 84 Whether cases will be brought to trial,
dismissed at trial, or reversed on appeal depend on a distinction
between reasonable and unreasonable applications. A successful
theory must explain this critical distinction and provide criteria by
which to guide, evaluate, justify, or critique particular judgments.
3. The Integration Constraint
Finally, a theory of evidence and proof must provide, or rely
upon, a plausible explanation of how the micro- and macro-levels fit
together. A theory that provides plausible accounts at both levels may
nevertheless fail if these accounts are inconsistent. For example, a
theory that, at the micro-level, accounts for relevance and probative
value in terms of the subjective beliefs of individual fact finders (i.e.,
that there is nothing more to relevance and probative value than what
each fact finder thinks, perhaps like matters of taste) cannot then, at
the macro-level, account for sufficiency of the evidence in terms that
imply that the subjective beliefs of individual fact finders may be
mistaken. Either there is more to the value of evidence than subjective

See, e.g., Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 633 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding summary
81.
judgment for defendant on issue of causation); cf. Zuchowitz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 387
(2d Cir. 1998) (analyzing whether finding of causation was clear error).
82. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (discussing the
relationship between burdens of proof and judgment as a matter of law).
83. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (discussing the reasonable
jury standard).
84. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 7, at 1147-49 (assuming that DNA evidence requires a
probabilistic interpretation of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to determine sufficiency).
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beliefs or there is not. A theory trying to have it both ways must at
85
least explain how this is possible and why it is plausible.
A theory may also be problematic if the relationships between
levels are left unexplained or are otherwise mysterious. For
two
the
example, a theory that explains relevance in terms of one86 set of
criteria and sufficiency in terms of a different set of criteria must
explain how the micro-level criteria translate at the macro-level, and
vice versa. In sum, a successful theory will bridge the gap between the
two levels.87
B. Additional Evidentiary Rules
The rules discussed thus far provide the doctrinal foundation
and sufficiency decisions. A matrix of additional
admissibility
for
evidentiary rules, however, also regulates specific aspects of the proof
process. For purposes of completeness and clarification, this Section
briefly explains the relationships among these additional rules; the
three theoretical criteria (micro, macro, and integration); and the
epistemic considerations (accuracy and the risk of error).
From an epistemic perspective, the addition of relevant
evidence at the micro-level increases the evidentiary base on which
decisions are made and thus should, other things being equal, improve
accuracy.88 Therefore, micro-level rules that exclude relevant evidence
Such an explanation may perhaps be constructed around the idea that there should be
85.
more judicial control at one level rather than the other. This explanation, however, would fail to
explain current doctrine, which allows for substantial judicial control of the fact-finding process
at both levels.
86. For example, one level may be explained in terms of subjective probability assessments
and the other level in terms of objective relative frequencies.
87. The better the relationship between these levels is explained, the better the theory. To
illustrate how this constraint may create problems for a theory, consider two nonlegal examples.
Suppose one claimed that morality is a matter of subjective taste (there are no moral facts) but
also claimed that a particular judgment on a moral issue was objectively true (a matter of fact).
Or suppose one claimed that water molecules are made of hydrogen and oxygen but also claimed
that water in sufficiently large quantities no longer contained hydrogen or oxygen. No doubt
apparent inconsistencies can sometimes be explained or explained away (we can explain why
water is wet but water molecules are not wet, for instance). In the examples, however, the
tension between the two claims creates additional problems in need of explanation, potentially
undermining each of the claims involved, in addition to any problems each claim may have on its
own. An evidentiary theory is better to the extent it avoids problems along these lines.
88. See RUDOLF CARNAP, LOGIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY 211 (1950) ("[T]he total
evidence available must be taken as a basis for determining the degree of confirmation.");
TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON,

KNOWLEDGE AND

ITS LIMITS

189-90

(2002) (discussing the "total

evidence" principle). When the relevance of evidence is itself in doubt, or depends on facts that
are uncertain or unlikely, evidence may be admitted "conditionally," subject to proof of these
conditional facts. FED. R. EVID. 104(b). It is important to note, however, that all evidence is
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must be justified. The possible justifications fall into four categories:
(1) economic, (2) other, nonepistemic policy goals, (3) jury control, or
(4) party control. First, evidence may be justifiably excluded if it is not
worth the costs of presenting and considering it. This may be the case
if it has only minimal probative value, it is cumulative of other
evidence, or its evidentiary value on the particular litigated issue is
otherwise not worth the costs. 89 Second, relevant evidence may be
justifiably excluded to serve a number of nonepistemic purposes
internal and external to the litigation process.90 "Internal" rules
include, for example, the attorney-client privilege and the rule
excluding evidence of compromise negotiations and related
statements.91 "External" rules include, for example, the marital
privileges and the rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures. 92 The third and fourth categories serve epistemic
rationales. Third, evidence may be excluded if jurors are prone to
"overvalue" the evidence (or otherwise be distracted by it) to such an
extent that it will detract from rather than aid in rational assessment
of the evidence and the disputed issue. 93 Fourth, evidence may be
excluded if doing so is likely to induce parties to produce better
evidence. 94
Although the relationship between admissibility rules and the
micro-level constraint is more readily apparent, the admissibility rules
also interact with the macro-level and integrationconstraints. This is
conditionally relevant in the sense that its value is contingent on the other evidence in the case
and what is known or not known about that evidence. See Ronald J. Allen, The Myth of
Conditional Relevancy, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 871 (1992) (extending the analysis of Vaughn Ball
infra); Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV. 435, 436 (1980)
(discussing this contingency). For an earlier discussion examining this contingency in the context
of authentication requirements, see Larry A. Alexander & Elaine A. Alexander, The
Authentication of Documents Requirement: Barrier to Falsehood or to Truth, 10 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 266 (1973). For a recent defense of foundational requirements, including conditional
relevance, see David A. Schwartz, A FoundationTheory of Evidence, 100 GEO. L.J. 95 (2011).
89. FED. R. EvID. 403.
90. "Internal" justifications include reasons for exclusion that are designed to aid or foster
aspects of the litigation process; "external" justifications include reasons for exclusion that are
designed to serve goals outside of litigation.
91. FED. R. EVID. 410.
92. FED. R. EvID. 407.
93. FED. R. EVD. 403.
94. FED. R. EvID. 602, 801-07, 901, 1001-08. See generally Dale A. Nance, The Best
Evidence Principle, 73 IowA L. REV. 227 (1998). Note, however, that there is no necessary
connection between probative value and these requirements. In other words, sometimes evidence
that fails to meet them may be more probative than evidence that does. The rules regulating
expert testimony, see FED. R. EvID. 702-06, are arguably justified based on some combination of
the first, third, and fourth rationales.
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so because-in addition to altering the evidentiary base and thus the
sufficiency of evidence at the macro-level-admissibility rules may
also shift the risk of error. For example, the exclusion of a document
on authentication grounds95 may cause a party with the burden of
proof (who would otherwise win) to lose if the evidence without the
document is insufficient (but would have been sufficient with the
document). 96 Moreover, a rule that admits or excludes evidence that is
typically proffered by one side rather than the other systematically
shifts a risk of error at the macro-level. 97
C. Clarifying Evidence Theory: Assumptions, Distractions,Confusions
Given the explosion of theoretical work in evidence law,
metatheoretical discussions travel on well-worn and hotly contested
ground. 98 Therefore, before proceeding to apply the theoretical criteria,
this Section briefly clarifies what is and what is not at stake in the
analysis to follow. In order to avoid possible misunderstanding and
confusions, the discussion proceeds by isolating the theoretical issues
examined in this Article from adjacent issues in the scholarly
literature that are not necessarily implicated.
In current debates about mathematical models of evidence,99
there are two different projects at the heart of the discussions.
Although they are related, it helps to keep them distinct. The first
project is the integration, as a practical matter, of statistical
information and statistical techniques into the litigation process.100
95. FED. R. EVID. 901.
96. See Alexander & Alexander, supra note 88, at 269. Exclusion under these
circumstances may also function to shift a burden of proof. See id. at 274.
97. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412-15 (admitting types of prosecution and plaintiff evidence,
and excluding types of defense evidence, in sexual assault cases). Other evidentiary devices,
including presumptions and judicial comment on the evidence, may also shift the risk of error.
See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, CASES & PROBLEMS 717-71 (5th ed. 2011)
(discussing presumptions, comment, and burdens of proof). Criminal offenses may also operate in
this manner when they penalize conduct not for its own sake but because of its probabilistic or
evidentiary relationship with other (harder to prove) criminal conduct. See Frederick Schauer,
Bentham on Presumed Offences, 23 UTILITAS 363 (2011) (analyzing several examples of such
offenses).
98. There appears to be substantial disagreement among evidence scholars about the
nature of relevance and probative value. See Roger Park et al., Bayes Wars Redivivus-An
Exchange, 8 INT'L COMM. ON EVID. 1 (2010).
99. See supra notes 7-13.

100. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, When 10 Trials Are Better than 1000: An Evidentiary
Perspective on Trial Sampling, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (2012); Edward K. Cheng, A Practical
Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 2081 (2009) [hereinafter Cheng,
PracticalSolution]; Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for 'Trial by Formula',90 TEX. L. REV. 571,
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The second is the integration, as a theoretical matter, of statistical
and other evidence into a conception or theoretical account of the proof
process that accords with the process's normative goals. These projects
are, of course, related-the theoretical accounts provide guidance for
practical integration as well as a standard by which to evaluate these
practices. For example, we have no idea whether evidence (statistical
or otherwise) is sufficient to satisfy the preponderance or beyond-areasonable-doubt standards without some prior conception or
presupposition of what these standards require. The two projects,
however, involve distinct methodological issues. The practical issues of
integration involve difficult empirical questions that are distinct from
the conceptual task of articulating an underlying theoretical account
of the nature and structure of legal proof. This Article focuses on the
theoretical, conceptual project.
To clarify this conceptual project, and to isolate it from
adjacent issues, this Part closes by making explicit six assumptions
presupposed by the analysis thus far and on which the applications to
follow will rely:
(1) Statistical evidence is distinct from a conception or account
of the proof process. In other words, whether statistical evidence is
relevant, how probative it is, and whether it is sufficient to satisfy a
proof standard are distinct issues from whether relevance, probative
value, or proof standards are probabilistic or ought to be conceived in
probabilistic terms. For example, consider the plaintiffs evidence in a
negligence case that the defendant owns ninety-five percent of the
buses in town in order to prove that one of the defendant's buses
caused the accident that injured the plaintiff. The relevance, probative
value, and sufficiency of the ninety-five percent datum as evidence in
the case are distinct issues from whether the evidentiary concepts and
rules are probabilistic or ought to be conceived as such. One cannot
draw evidentiary conclusions about statistical evidence for purposes of
legal proof without relying upon some conception of what is required
by the evidentiary rules and concepts. 101
593 (2012) (advocating the use of statistical methods to improve outcome equality in civil cases);
Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The UnwittingPolicy Making of
Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771 (2010); see also COLIN AITKEN, PAUL
ROBERTS & GRAHAM JACKSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (Royal Stat. Soc'y, 2011).
101. For example, one cannot determine whether statistical evidence is sufficient to satisfy
the preponderance standard without some conception of what is required by the standard.
"Greater than 0.5" is one interpretation, but it is not the only one. What is required by the
preponderance standard is a conceptually distinct issue from the sufficiency of statistical
evidence in a given case.
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(2) The practical issues surroundingwhether a type of evidence
(e.g., statistical evidence or statistical techniques) ought to be
introduced in litigation are distinct issues from the theoretical issues
regarding conceptions of evidence and proof. The practical issues
depend on whether it will improve or detract from accurate factfinding, and they depend on complex empirical questions concerning
how fact finders are likely to respond to the evidence under different
conditions, compared with likely fact finder behavior in the absence of
this evidence. 102
(3) Statistical evidence is neither necessarily inferior nor
superior to nonstatisticalevidence as an epistemological matter. There
is no abstract epistemic distinction, a priori or otherwise, between
evidence expressed in statistical terms and evidence expressed in
nonstatistical terms. 103
(4) Both statistical and nonquantified evidence are based on
similar types of generalizations.For example, the probative value of a
witness's testimony depends on generalizations about the witness's
propensity for accurate perception, memory, narration, and
truthfulness, as well as generalizations about the behavior of other
people in the witness's situation. These generalizations link the
testimony to the facts of a particular case in ways that are
substantially similar to the generalizations that apply to statistical
evidence.104

(5) Theoretical conceptions of evidence may be useful as
teaching tools or for drawing attention to certain issues, even if they
otherwise fail as a theory. That they serve this heuristic value should
not be underestimated or diminished. But serving heuristic or
pedagogical purposes should also not be confused with a successful
theory.
102. Even if jurors are not particularly adept at assessing statistical evidence, see Koehler,
supra note 18, the introduction of this evidence may still do epistemic good if decisions are better
than what they would be without the evidence. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good
Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1192 (2010)
(arguing that the admissibility of scientific evidence should depend, in part, on the quality of the
evidence that would be relied on in its absence).
103. See Amit Pundik, What Is Wrong with Statistical Evidence? The Attempts to Establish
an Epistemic Deficiency, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 461 (2008) (assuming that evidence scholars rely on
this distinction). Even if statistical evidence is not epistemically inferior, some types of statistical
and nonstatistical evidence may differ with regard to other epistemic features. See Enoch,
Spectre & Fisher, supra note 13 (distinguishing examples of statistical and nonstatistical
evidence based on the "sensitivity" of the inferences it supports). There may also be moral or
political reasons to distinguish between statistical and nonstatistical evidence.
104. For an illustration of this inferential process, see ALLEN ET AL., supranote 97, at 12230.
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(6) Finally, with regard to these theoretical issues, there is a
false dichotomy between probabilistic conceptions of proof and the
Story Model.105 The alternative to rejecting probabilistic conceptions,
however, is not an evidentiary free-for-all in which whatever
persuades, works, or in which all fact-finding reduces to intuitions
about narratives. The Story Model is a descriptive psychological
account of jury behavior, and a particularly good one at that. 06 Any
theoretical conception would be wise to take account of empirical
knowledge of fact finder behavior. But whether the account is true,107
and whether lawyers present cases in the form of narratives, are
distinct issues from theoretical accounts of the nature and structure of
legal proof. There is conceptual space for a nonprobabilistictheoretical
account of legal proof that also provides normative guidance and
constraint. 08
II. A PROBABILISTIC CONCEPTION OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF
The dominant theoretical account conceives of evidence and
proof in probabilistic terms. This Part first outlines the basic contours
of this conception and then evaluates the conception in detail based on
the three theoretical criteria articulated in Part I.
Under the probabilistic conception, factual propositions may be
assessed according to their probability given the evidence. Although
the details of this conception may be characterized in a variety of
ways, a few features are common. First, at the micro-level, relevance
and probative value are expressed as an increase or decrease in
probability based on evidence. Second, at the macro-level, standards of
proof are expressed as probabilistic thresholds, and a factual issue is
"proven" when its probability given the evidence exceeds the
threshold. Finally, the probabilistic assessments conform to the
axioms or rules of probability theory.109 The following are the most
prominent of these rules:
105. See Kenworthey Bilz, We Don't Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and The
Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 429, 435 (discussing these two models). See
generally LEGAL EVIDENCE AND PROOF: STATISTICS, STORIES, AND LOGIC (Henry Kaptein et al.

eds., 2009).
106. See supra note 17.
107. Id

108. See Griffin, supra note 20 (arguing that changes in evidentiary and procedural rules
may improve accuracy given current empirical knowledge of jury decisionmaking).
109. See generally ANDREI KOLMOGOROV, FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY OF PROBABILITY

(1956). Individual probabilities may be expressed in various ways: (1) logical relations, (2)
frequencies, (3) propensities, or (4) subjective degrees of belief. For a useful overview see Alan
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(1) probability assessments fall somewhere on a scale between
1 (which equals certain truth) and 0 (which equals certain falsity);
(2) the probability of a proposition and its negation equals 1;110
(3) the probability of two independent propositions conforms to
the product rule;111 and
(4) the probability of a proposition in light of new evidence
conforms to Bayes' Theorem 12
This Part argues that the probabilistic conception fails each of
the three theoretical constraints. To be clear, my focus is on
theoretical accounts of legal proof that rely on probability theory. My
analysis is not a critique of probability theory; it a critique of
particular uses to which probability theory is put by legal theorists."'
At the micro-level, this conception fails to adequately explain the
relevance and probative value of evidence. At the macro-level, this
conception fails to explain standards of proof. This conception also

Hajek, Interpretations of Probability, STANFORD

ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.

(Dec.

19, 2011),

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/. In the context of legal proof, probability
assessments depend primarily on relative frequencies when the relevant data are available and
subjective degrees of belief when data are not available.
110. If the probability of a proposition P (e.g., "the defendant is guilty") is 0.6, then the
probability of not-P ("the defendant is not guilty") equals 0.4.
111. If the probability of P1 is 0.5 and the probability of P2 is 0.5, and the two events

expressed by the propositions are independent of one another, then the probability of P1 and P2
equals 0.25.
112. Thomas Bayes, An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, 53
PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON 370 (1763), available at http://rstl.royalsocietypublishing.org/
content/53/370 . Bayes' Theorem allows one to calculate the probability of proposition in light of

new evidence by multiplying (1) the "prior probability" (before receiving the evidence) by (2) the
"likelihood ratio" (the probability of the evidence, given the proposition, divided by the
probability of the evidence, given the negation of the proposition). Bayes' Theorem may be
expressed in two different forms: an "odds" form and a "probability" form.
Suppose we want to calculate the odds (0) or probability (P) of a defendant's guilt (G) based
on some evidence (E) using Bayes' Theorem. In addition to the above letters, the symbol " I" will
be used to indicate "given" (as in the O(G) I E means "the odds of guilt given the evidence") and
"not-" will indicate negation.
The odds form of the theorem is the following:
O(G) IE =
(P(E) I G / P(E) I not-G) x O(G)
The slightly more complicated probabilityform of the theorem is the following:
P(G) I E =
(P(E) I G / (P(E) I G x P(G) + P(E) I not-G x P(not-G))) x P(G)
For clear overviews of Bayes' Theorem, and how it may be derived, see IAN HACKING,
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC (2001), and AITKEN, ROBERTS & JACKSON,

supra note 100.
113. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 859 (discussing conventional probabilistic conceptions of
legal proof, noting conceptual difficulties, and concluding that we "need to start from scratch").
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fails the integration constraint because its micro- and macro-level
accounts are inconsistent with one another.
A. The Micro-Level Constraint
The micro-level constraint requires that a theory account for
relevance and probative value. It must explain these concepts and
provide criteria for evaluating applications.
1. Relevance
Evidence is "relevant" if it "has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and the
fact is "of consequence in determining the action." 114 Evidence that is
not relevant is not admissible. 115 The phrase "more or less probable" in
the definition naturally invites the probabilistic conception (perhaps
even suggesting a tautology), but this interpretation does not
necessarily follow. 116
The use of "probable" in Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence should not necessarily be taken to codify the probabilistic
conception. First, the particular theory of mathematical probability
underlying this conception is just one of several different theories or
types of "probability.""'7 Therefore, "probable" in the rule is
ambiguous; it does not necessarily mean "probable according to the
dictates of conventional probability theory." Second, the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 401 make clear that the relevance definition
is referring to evidence that provides epistemic support for material
propositions more generally-that is, evidence that provides some
reason in support of (or "tends to prove") whether a particular fact is
true or false-rather than a particular theory of probability.118 The
114. FED. R. EVID. 401.
115. FED. R. EVID. 402.
116. See Risinger, supra note 59 ("[R]elevance is a much more problematic concept than
most people realize."). My use of "necessarily" here and in the following paragraph in the text is
intended to leave open the possibility that the probabilistic conception may, at the end of the day,
turn out to provide the best theoretical conception of relevance (although the analysis that
follows will reject this possibility). The discussion in the text is meant to foreclose declarations of
early victory for the probabilistic conception based on the language (and history) of Rule 401. For
a discussion of the relationship between the language of Rule 401 and the probabilistic
conception, see Park et al., supra note 98.
117. See supra note 39.
118. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory Committee notes ("Relevancy . . . exists only as a
relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case. Does the item of
evidence tend to prove the matter sought to be proved?") By "epistemic support" throughout this
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committee explains that whether evidence "tends to prove" a matter in
the case will depend on principles from "experience," "science," and
"logic," and that "[a]ny more stringent requirement is unworkable and
unrealistic."1 19 Moreover, the note explains that the "probability"
language in the Rule was used merely to avoid "confusion between
questions of admissibility and questions of sufficiency."120 Thus, any
evidence that serves the function of providing epistemic support
("tends to prove") is relevant, regardless of whether or not it conforms
to the dictates of a particular theory. The probabilistic conception
explains some, but not all, cases of epistemic relevance, the notion
expressed in Rule 401.121
According to the probabilistic conception, relevance depends on
whether it changes the probability of a proposition at issue. Relevance
is expressed either in terms of a "likelihood ratio"122 or in terms of
whether it increases (or decreases) the probability of a proposition
from its prior probability.123 This conception is offered both as an

Article, I mean evidence that provides some reason to believe that a particular proposition is true
or false. This support need not provide a conclusive reason and it may or may not provide
epistemic justification for beliefs about the proposition. On the latter, see Michael S. Pardo, The
Gettier Problem and Legal Proof, 16 LEGAL THEORY 37 (2010).
119. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory Committee notes ("Whether the [relevance] relationship
exists depends upon principles evolved by experience or science, applied logically to the situation
at hand... . Any more stringent requirement is unworkable and unrealistic.").
120. See id. ("Dealing with probability in the language of the rule has the added virtue of
avoiding confusion between questions of admissibility and questions of the sufficiency of the
evidence.").
121. As a general matter, the term "relevance" has two different senses. The first,
conversationalrelevance, concerns whether an assertion relates to the topic of a conversation.
For discussions of this sense, see PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAY
OF WORDS 24-27 (1989) (discussing conversational implicatures and the maxim of relevance). See
also DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION (1986).
The second, epistemic relevance, concerns whether evidence supports the truth of a proposition.
For a discussion of this sense, see Peter Achinstein, THE BOOK OF EVIDENCE 95-112 (2001)
(discussing ways in which epistemic justification diverges from different probabilistic conceptions
of evidence). The second sense is the one expressed in FED. R. EVID. 401 (stating that evidence is
relevant if "it has the tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence"). See also L. Jonathan Cohen, Some Steps Towards a General Theory of Relevance, 101
SYNTHESE 171, 172-82 (1994) (discussing the similar inferential structure of these two senses).
122. See Lempert, supra note 9, at 1025-27 (describing the formula for the likelihood ratio
and its relation to logical relevance).
123. See Deborah Davis & William C. Follette, Rethinking the Probative Value of Evidence:
Base Rates, Intuitive Profiling,and the "Postdiction"of Behavior, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 133, 13653 (2002). Davis and Follette attempt to depict how probability can be used to show that certain
testimony is irrelevant. In this particular study, they argue that "the relative increase in
likelihood that an unfaithful man will murder his wife, over the likelihood that a faithful man
will murder his wife is so infinitesimal . .. as to be totally insignificant." Id.
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explanation of the meaning of Rule 401's definition of relevance 24 and
as a normative standard by which to assess possible relevance. 125
The "likelihood ratio" measures the probability of receiving
evidence if a proposition is true, divided by the probability of receiving
the evidence if the proposition is false. 126 Consistent with Bayes'
Theorem, 127 we can multiply the likelihood ratio by the prior
probability to arrive at an updated probability. Consider the following
example provided by Professor Lempert in his classic article:
Blood Type: If we know that the perpetrator of a crime has Type A blood, and we have
evidence that the defendant has Type A blood, the evidence is relevant to proving the
defendant is the perpetrator if (1) the probability of this evidence (he is Type A), given
that he is the perpetrator, is greater than (2) the probability of this evidence, given that
he is not the perpetrator. 12 8

Lempert assumes that fifty percent of the population have the
same blood type and analyzes the evidence as follows: the probability
of the evidence, given that he is the perpetrator, is 1; the probability, if
he is not the perpetrator, is 0.5. Dividing the first number by the
second yields 2:1 odds of guilt (or 0.67 probability). 129
As a general matter, any likelihood ratio other than 1 yields a
conclusion that the evidence is relevant.130 If the odds are greater than
1:1, then the evidence is relevant for proving the proposition at issue.
If the odds are lower than 1:1, then the evidence is relevant for
disproving the proposition at issue. 131 Probative value is expressed
under this conception based on how much greater (or lower) than 1 the

124. See Lempert, supra note 9, at 1025 (describing likelihood ratio as the "mathematical
equivalent" of "relevant evidence" in FED. R. EVID. 401).
125. Id. at 1023 ("[Tlhis is a normative model.").
126. Id. at 1023-24; see also AITKEN, ROBERTS & JACKSON, supra note 100, at 38-39, 43-50
(discussing likelihood ratios).
127. See Lempert, supra note 9, at 1022-25 (describing the application of Bayes' Theorem to
determining whether a new piece of evidence would influence a "rational decision-maker's odds
that a defendant is guilty").
128. See id. at 1023-25 (providing the Blood Type example and describing the likelihood
ratio and its effects on relevance).
129. Id. at 1024-25. The 2:1 ratio derives from dividing 1 by 0.5. The odds form is converted
to a probability form by dividing the numerator (2) by the total number of possibilities (3). If we
start with even odds (1:1 or 0.5)-or no reason to think guilt or non-guilt is more likely-then
when we multiply the likelihood ratio by the prior odds we will get the same result: 2:1. We can
then use this new number as the "prior odds" and multiply it by the likelihood ratio for the next
item of evidence, and so on. Id. at 1023-24.
130. Id. at 1025.
131. The odds will be lower when the probability of the evidence, assuming the proposition
at issue is true, is lower than the probability assuming the proposition is false.
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likelihood ratio is.132 A likelihood ratio of 1:1 means the evidence is
irrelevant. Consider the following example of irrelevant evidence:
Liberal Candidates: "In a criminal trial, there is evidence that the
defendant supports liberal political candidates." 33
As Lempert explains:
Absent some reason to believe that liberals are more prone to commit the crime in
question, the probability that the defendant could have been shown to be liberal were he
guilty is ... the same as the probability that he could have been shown to be a liberal
34
were he not guilty.1

The odds of guilt remain what they were before considering the
evidence. Thus, under this conception, the evidence is irrelevant.
Likelihood ratios, to be sure, capture something intuitive and
important about relevance. 35 But likelihood ratios do not adequately
explain the meaning of relevance 36 or provide the necessary guidance
and constraint to serve as a normative theory.'37 This is so because
evidence may be relevant even when there is no "reason to believe"
anything at all about the likelihood ratio, whether it is 1:1 or not.
Moreover, in some cases there will be good reasons to believe evidence
is relevant when the likelihood ratio implies that it is irrelevant.
132. See Kaye, supra note 9, at 684 (stating that the greater the amount that the likelihood
ratio departs "from unity, the greater the probative value of the data").
133. Lempert, supra note 9, at 1025.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. The likelihood ratio also draws attention to the important issue of how likely the
evidence would exist even if the proposition for which it is offered were false. See id. at 1023-24
(providing the formula for the likelihood ratio).
136. Claims about the "meaning of relevance" purport to be analytically true claims. See
generally H.P. Grice & P.F. Strawson, In Defense of a Dogma, 65 PHIL. REV. 141 (1956)
(discussing analytic claims). Therefore, a single counterexample in which relevance and
likelihood ratios diverge is sufficient to demonstrate that likelihood ratios do not capture the
meaning of relevance. For doubts about analytic claims generally, the classic article is W.V.
Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 (1953).
137. In pointing to examples of relevance that do not fit the likelihood-ratio theory, I do not
mean to suggest merely that there are other aspects to relevance (e.g., that some illustrative or
demonstrative evidence may be relevant only to the extent it helps jurors understand other
evidence and has no independent relevance, general background details, or res gestae). Moreover,
if evidence is not relevant, it should not be admitted over a relevance objection. See FED. R. EVID.
402 ("Irrelevant evidence is not admissible."). It is sometimes assumed that Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), expanded the scope of relevance to include anything that makes a
story persuasive. But this is not right. Old Chief was about probative value and the substitution
of one piece of relevant evidence for another piece of relevant evidence because of narrative
considerations. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174, 184 (holding that in a trial for a crime that
requires a previous conviction "a district court abuses its discretion if it spurns ... an offer [to
concede the fact of a prior conviction] and admits the full record of a prior judgment, when the
name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper
considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior
conviction").
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To see how relevance may diverge from the likelihood-ratio
view, begin with a simple observation about actual trials. In any given
trial, there may be evidence that each side claims supports its theory
(or story) of what happened, but that evidence may not distinguish
between the cases. In other words, the evidence will form an integral
part of each side's proof, but there may be no reason to believe that the
likelihood ratio for that evidence is anything other than 1. Like the
Liberal Candidates example, any conclusion to the contrary would be
sheer speculation. Unlike that example, however, the evidence may
still be relevant precisely because it forms an integral part of each
side's explanation as to what happened. If any such evidence exists,
then it provides a counterexample to the likelihood-ratio view as
either a theory of the meaning of relevance138 or as a normative
theory. 3 9
Here is a detailed example of such evidence from a criminal
40
trial.1 The defendant, an inmate at a maximum-security prison, was
charged with two counts of battery on prison guards. 141 The charges
arose from an altercation between the defendant and guards after the
defendant refused to return a food tray in his cell. The prosecution's
theory was that the defendant battered the officers when they opened
the cell door to retrieve the tray.142 The defendant testified that one of
the guards rushed in and began hitting him first, and his attorney
argued that, even if the defendant made contact first with the officer,
the defendant was acting in self-defense. 14 3
In sorting out what happened, a reasonable juror might like to
know what precipitated the altercation. Why did the defendant
withhold the tray in the first place? Both sides provided a number of
details on this point. The attorneys discussed during opening and
closing arguments that the defendant had not received a package sent
to him by his family, and that after several weeks and several
attempts to speak with a sergeant about it, the defendant refused to

138. See supra note 136 (stating that divergence between relevance and likelihood ratios in
a single counterexample would show that relevance is not captured fully by likelihood ratios).
139. If the evidence is relevant, and the likelihood ratio implies that it is irrelevant and
ought to be excluded, then the likelihood ratio fails as a normative standard by which to gauge
relevance.
140. The trial transcript is printed in ALLEN ET AL., supra note 97, at 1-77.
141. Id. at 2-3.
142. Id. at 5-7.
143. Id. at 39-40, 53.
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return his food tray. 144 Multiple witnesses for each side testified to
details about the package and the mail procedures at the prison. 145
Each side used this evidence to support its competing theory: (1) the
defendant was frustrated and angry about not receiving the package,
withheld his tray, and charged the guard, 146 and (2) the defendant was
frustrated about not receiving the package, withheld the tray to get a
sergeant's attention about the matter, and in response the guards
attacked him (to retaliate or punish him for this behavior). 147 The
evidence does not appear to distinguish between the two theories; as
with the Liberal Candidates example above, 148 there is no reason to
believe that this evidence supports one theory over the other. In other
words, the likelihood ratio is 1:1. Under the likelihood-ratio theory,
the evidence is irrelevant (and a fortiori has no probative value), and,
thus, should have been excluded. 149 If this conception were true, the
jury would have been forced to choose between who started the
altercation without giving them any information about the events that
precipitated it. The apparent relevance of this evidence--despite its
144. From the Prosecution's Opening Statement: "For whatever reason, inmate Johnson, the
defendant in this case, was standing in his cell with the trays in his hand and he had some
discussion with the officers about a package. He wanted some package." Id. at 6.
From the Defense's Opening Statement: "[T]he defendant was notified that a package had
arrived-that he was aware of the fact somehow or other that a package had been sent to him by
his family. A substantial period of time goes by. . . . Finally, on the 28th he withholds the tray,
which I agree is disobedient." Id. at 39.
From the Prosecution's Closing Argument: "[F]or some reason inmate Johnson chose to draw
the line that day over some package that he claimed he wasn't getting." Id. at 66.
From the Defense's Closing Argument: "Johnson chose to draw the line. I agree. He drew the
line, 'I want something done; I want to see a sergeant . . .' And it's obvious from the testimony
that if he just kept on drawing the line at some point he would have seen a sergeant. That
doesn't mean Johnson made a choice to go out and start battering the officer or officers." Id. at
71.
145. See, e.g., id. at 34 (testimony from prison guard), 42 (testimony from cellmate), 52
(testimony from defendant); see also id. at 42 (overruling relevance objection regarding package
procedures).
146. Id. at 66.
147. Id. at 71.
148. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (describing the Liberal Candidates
scenario). Lempert also notes that "the court is justified in excluding evidence on the ground of
logical irrelevance" when "it would be unreasonable for a jury to find the likelihood ratio to be
slightly different from one." Lempert, supra note 9, at 1026 n.21. In both Liberal Candidates and
Johnson, the jury has no reasonable basis for concluding the likelihood ratio is slightly different
from 1. Both examples would require the same types of unsupported speculation to conclude
otherwise. This is not to deny, however, that the evidence in both examples might be
"conditionally relevant," or relevant if other facts are known or are supported by evidence (e.g.,
the relative frequency of batteries by inmates on guards versus by guards on inmates at the
prison in Johnson). Conditional relevance is discussed supra note 88.
149. See generally FED. R. EVID. 402 ("Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.").
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likelihood ratio of 1-provides a reductio ad absurdum for the theory.
The evidence is relevant because it provides epistemic support for
each side's explanation of what happened.150 The fact that it supports
both explanations does not make it irrelevant. The existence of this
type of "overlapping" relevant evidence is problematic for the
likelihood-ratio theory.1s
The analytical tensions between relevance and the probabilistic
conception can be brought into focus with a few more stylized
examples.
Twins: A witness will testify that someone matching the defendant's description was
seen fleeing a crime scene. The defendant claims that it was his identical twin and
introduces evidence establishing the twin's existence. Suppose there is no reason to
believe the testimony distinguishes the defendant from his twin.

If we are comparing the likelihood of the defendant's guilt
versus his twin, then, as with Liberal Candidates and Johnson, there
does not appear to be any reason to think the likelihood ratio is
150. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing epistemic support for relevancy).
One way it supports each explanation is by providing evidence that each side must explain in
order for the explanations to be plausible; explanations that could not account for the
overlapping evidence would fail. The evidence, in other words, provides a "test" for possible
explanations. For a similar idea in the philosophy of science, see Deborah G. Mayo, Evidence as
Passing Severe Tests: Highly Probable vs. Highly Probed Hypotheses, in SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 95-127 (Peter Achinstein ed., 2005). A similar

phenomenon arises with questions of law: if two sides to a legal dispute can each explain why a
previous precedent supports their answer, this does not render the prior precedent irrelevant.
Legal questions have ineluctable factual aspects and so the issue of "overlapping" evidence arises
in this context just as it does in the context of legal proof. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S.
Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003). Keeping
"overlapping" evidence from juries is likely to detract from rather than foster accuracy. This is, of
course, an empirical claim that might turn out to be false in certain cases. But the claim is
consistent with the general principle in evidence law that more information about cases will lead
to more accurate determinations, unless there is a compelling countervailing reason to keep that
information from decisionmakers. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. It is also
intuitively plausible. Consider two analogies. Suppose trying to determine which of two pictures
is more accurate by seeing only the differences between them rather than the parts they each
share; or imagine building two chairs with only the parts that differ between them rather than
the parts they are likely to share (legs, a seat, a back, etc.). Whether it is pictures, chairs, or
explanations at trial, what is shared may be as important as what is distinct, even when the
judgments that follow concern comparative assessments. If legal proof involves judgments about
competing explanations as a whole, as Part III argues infra, then it is not surprising that
evidence supporting parts of those explanations would be relevant even when the evidence
supports more than one explanation and does not distinguish them. Two different chairs may be
built with the exact same type of seat, but this does not mean that information about the seat is
irrelevant in assessing which is a better chair.
151. The prevalence of this type of evidence is an empirical question, but most trials will
have at least a few examples. The prevalence is not relevant for purposes of this Article; so long
as at least one example exists, that is sufficient to falsify the theory as either the meaning of
relevance or as a normative theory. See supra notes 136-39.
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different from 1. Nevertheless, the evidence is relevant. It provides
some epistemic support for both possibilities (i.e., the defendant did it
or the twin did it),152 and it "tends to prove" each side's explanation of
what happened. The fact that it supports both explanations (as in
Johnson) does not make it irrelevant. Of course, the probabilist has a
rejoinder as to why the evidence is also relevant under a probabilistic
interpretation: namely, it eliminates everybody except the defendant
and his twin, and by eliminating everyone else it thereby increases the
probability the defendant is guilty. The rejoinder is correct-but notice
the tension between this conclusion and the implications of the
likelihood-ratio view. Although the evidence is relevant because it
eliminates all other suspects, it technically fails to fit the likelihoodratio conception as soon as evidence about the twin is introduced. As
soon as the twin evidence is introduced, the probability of the
evidence, given the defendant's guilt, is exactly the same as the
probability of the evidence, given the defendant's nonguilt (assuming
this is equivalent to the probability of the twin's guilt). If that is so,
then under this interpretation the likelihood ratio implies that the
witness's testimony should be excluded as irrelevant. 153
Moreover, evidence may be epistemically relevant for proving a
proposition even when it does not appear to increase the probability of
that proposition. Consider the following example:
Poison: The Prosecution alleges that Victim died of poisoning, and Defendant contends
that Victim died from some other cause. There is evidence that at 12:00 p.m. on the day
he collapsed and died, Victim's lunch contained a poison that is fatal for ninety percent
of the people who ingest it. Suppose there is also evidence that at 12:30 p.m., Victim
ingested a second poison concealed in a drink that completely counteracts the first
15 4
poison; however, it is fatal for eighty percent of the people who ingest it.

Is evidence of the second poison relevant for proving that
Victim died of poisoning? Yes, of course. Articulating exactly why,
however, is critical for understanding the potential analytic gap
between epistemic relevance and probability. The evidence supports
the Prosecution's theory that Victim died of poisoning and is relevant
for that purpose, even if the evidence about the first poison has been
152. By contrast, in Liberal Candidates, the evidence provides no epistemic support for the
defendant's guilt.
153. But see supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
154. This example and the next one (Lottery) are based on similar examples provided by
Peter Achinstein, writing within the philosophy of science. See ACHINSTEIN, supra note 121, at
69-71 (discussing the examples entitled "intervening cause counterexample" and "first lottery
counterexample"). Despite some important differences between the scientific and legal contexts,
Achinstein similarly concludes that his examples show that an increase in probability is neither
necessary nor sufficient to constitute evidence for a proposition. Id. at 71.
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admitted. Notice, however, that the evidence regarding the second
poison actually lowers the probability that Victim died of poisoning
from the prior probability without the evidence.
A defender of the probabilistic conception has two possible
rejoinders to account for the relevance of this evidence. First, because
the evidence lowers the probability, it is also relevant for disproving
that Victim died of poisoning. Yes, perhaps 155 -but this, by hypothesis,
was not the Prosecutor's theory of relevance for seeking to admit the
evidence. A party's theory of relevance (when faced with a relevance
objection) commits it to a particular reason why the evidence is
relevant (i.e., what it tends to prove). 156 In this example, the
Prosecution is seeking to admit the evidence for a particular purpose,
not to support an alternative theory implied by the probabilistic
conception. Alternatively, the probabilist defender may also attempt to
recharacterize the example so that it supports the Prosecution's theory
while also resulting in an increase in probability. For example, we
might separate the two effects of the second poison as two distinct
pieces of evidence: counteracting the first poison and causing death.
Under this reinterpretation, the first piece of evidence lowers the
probability to zero percent and, then, the second piece of evidence
raises the probability to 0.8, thus making the evidence relevant and
raising the probability. This type of ad hoc recharacterization suggests
155. Parties offering evidence will have to make an offer of proof in response to a relevance
objection. See FED. R. EVID. 103; JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 130.20[4] (2d ed. 1997) (explaining that offers of proof under Rule 103 are
"meant to give the judge contemporaneous knowledge about the proposed evidence, so that the
judge can make a proper ruling on the evidence at the time it is proffered"). Accordingly, except
in extraordinary circumstances, courts will not entertain theories of relevance not offered by the
proffering party. See United States v. Boulware, 558 F.3d 971, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2009); Unites
States v. Lara-Hernandez, 588 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The presentation of additional
evidentiary theories [of relevance] for the first time after the jury has returned its verdict does
not comport with the salutary purpose of the timeliness requirement to allow the trial judge to
make an informed ruling based on the issues as framed by the parties." (emphasis added))
Parties may, of course, be mistaken about whether and why evidence is relevant. The example in
the text illustrates, however, that relevance determinations will (1) involve a particular
argument about why the evidence is relevant, and (2) the evaluation of that argument depends
on more than the likelihood ratio, including whether it supports one of the explanations at trial.
This theory of relevance reveals an additional disjunct between the probabilistic conception and
relevance in actual criminal trials-it seems unlikely that a criminal defendant would introduce
evidence of the second poison in order to prove Victim did not die of poisoning.
156. Parties may also introduce evidence that supports the other side's case to "take the
sting out" of potentially damaging evidence. Nothing in the above analysis is inconsistent with
this possibility. Evidence does not become irrelevant because it does not support the party
offering it. Rather, parties are "taking the sting out" precisely because it supports the other side's
case. If the evidence in Poison supports Defendant's theory, then the Prosecution could also offer
the evidence for this reason.
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that there may indeed be creative ways to make the probabilistic
conception fit with epistemic relevance.15 7 But this also reveals that
judgments about epistemic relevance are doing the real work
justifying particular inferences; the ad hoc probabilistic descriptions
(which can be articulated in a variety of different ways15 8) are
epiphenomenal.
Furthermore, evidence may not be epistemically relevant for
proving a proposition even when it does appear to raise the probability
of that proposition. Consider the following example:
Lottery: Victim was murdered. The motive appears to be that Victim ran an illegal
lottery and refused to pay the winner. It is unknown who actually won the lottery. The
Prosecution claims it was Defendant, and Defendant claims it was Rival. Defendant
purchased one of the one thousand total lottery tickets and Rival purchased ninety-nine
tickets. Suppose there is also evidence that the other nine hundred tickets were never
159
sold and have been accounted for.

Is evidence about the other nine hundred tickets relevant for
proving Defendant's guilt? Is it relevant for proving Defendant's
innocence? Both? Neither? Here, the probability that Defendant was
the winner of the lottery (and thus is guilty) went from 1 in 1000 to 1
in 100 with the introduction of the evidence about the nine hundred
tickets. Despite this increase in probability, the evidence does not
provide epistemic support for proving Defendant's guilt.160 Indeed, the
evidence better supports Defendant's theory that Rival is the
culprit. 161 As with the other examples, a defender of the probabilistic
conception may respond by either offering alternative theories of
relevance (e.g., it is relevant for proving guilt because it eliminates
nine hundred other possibilities) or offering a recharacterization
consistent with the analysis (e.g., it increases the probability of Rival's
guilt and, hence, Defendant's innocence), but the fact remains that
epistemic support undergirds relevance and justifies evidentiary
inferences. Probabilistic judgments may diverge from this support, or
they may be adjusted in an ad hoc fashion to conform to this support.
157. See generally supra note 121 and accompanying text.
158. Is the second poisoning one event or two (or twenty or a hundred)? Is it one piece of
evidence, or two, or twenty, or one hundred, and so on? Any piece of evidence can be described in
more and more fine-grained ways such that it becomes several items of evidence.
159. See ACHINSTEIN, supra note 121, at 69-70 (setting forth the "first lottery
counterexample"). Although the evidence in this example is statistical in form, nothing in the
analysis necessarily turns on this feature. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
161. Perhaps one might argue the evidence is irrelevant because it keeps the same relative
ratio of tickets between Defendant and Rival. But either side would likely try to take advantage
of evidence of the unknown nine hundred tickets, which may be another example of overlapping
evidence. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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The inadequacy of the probabilistic conception to account fully
for epistemic relevance derives from the fact that the category of
epistemic support is a general one, which probabilistic inferences may
or may not fit. Jonathan Cohen has analyzed this potential for
divergence between relevance and probability in a previous article. As
Cohen explains: "[Relevance] is a relation-typically appreciated or
pointed out in the course of a reasoned enquiry, debate, conversation,
meditation, explanation, or justification-between a true proposition
and an askable question." 162
And, "[a]nything that can sanction a reason, even if an
incomplete or inconclusive reason, for accepting a particular type of
proposition as a correct answer, or for rejecting it as an incorrect
answer, to an askable type of question can count as a criterion of
relevance." 163
In the trial context, the askable question is typically "what
happened?" (or other questions that relate to whether the elements of
the cause of action, crime, or affirmative defense have been proven),
and any evidence that provides a reason for accepting an explanation
as a correct answer to that question is relevant. A change in
probability is "just one criterion of relevance alongside the others,"164
and the misconception is to assume it is the sine qua non or "lies at
the heart of the matter." 165
The examples and the analysis of relevance do not, to be sure,
present a knockdown refutation of the probabilistic conception.
Nevertheless, they do reveal the primacy of epistemic support as the
foundation of relevance,166 and they raise doubts about the ability of
the probabilistic conception to provide an adequate theory of
relevance. This is troubling for the probabilistic conception because
relevance is the one evidentiary issue on which the probabilistic
162. Cohen, supra note 121, at 178. Cohen provides the following schematic outline for
nonconversational, epistemic relevance:
[A] true proposition R is nonconversationally relevant to an askable question Q if and
only if there is a proposition A such that the truth of R is or would be some reason,
though not necessarily a complete or conclusive reason, for anyone's accepting or
rejecting A as an answer to Q, where this is warranted by some nonconversational
principle.

Id.; see also Susan Haack, The Embedded Epistemologist: Dispatchesfrom the Legal Front, 25
RATIO JURIS 206, 215-18 (2012) (distinguishing epistemic warrant from standard mathematic
probabilities in the context of legal proof).
163. Cohen, supra note 121, at 181.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 180.
166. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing relevance and epistemic
support).
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conception appears to be on the firmest ground.X67 As we will see,
however, the troubles with relevance are just the beginning, and are
by no means the most serious problems, for this conception. The
problems with explaining probative value, and the macro-level and
integration constraints even more so, will turn the doubts raised thus
far into warranted conclusions about the implausibility of this
conception as a general theory of evidence and proof.
2. Probative Value
Probative value refers to the strength of the evidence in
proving or disproving a fact of consequence. This value depends on the
logical or empirical relationships between evidence and the
propositions for which it is offered, along with other contextual factors
such as a party's need for evidence, the importance of the issue, and
the extent to which it is contested by the other side.168 Evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by one or
more countervailing considerations.169 As with relevance, likelihood
ratios are offered to explain probative value.170
Attempts to quantify probative value using likelihood ratios,
however, run into the problem of reference classes.171 Quantifying
probative value involves placing the evidence in a particular class (for
which data are available). Consider this example from the McCormick
Treatise on Evidence concerning "a behavioral pattern said to be
characteristic of abused children":
Abuse: If research established that the behavior is equally common among abused and
nonabused children, then its likelihood ratio would be 1, and evidence of that pattern
would not be probative of abuse .. . And if it were a thousand times more common
172
among abused children, its probative value would be far greater.

167. This is because FED. R. EVID. 401 appears to provide some textual support for this
conception of relevance, but see supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text, and because
relevance is thought to be synonymous with a change in probability. See Lempert, supra note 9,
at 1025-26.
168. Supra note 64 and accompanying text. See generally FED. R. EVID. 403.
169. FED. R. EVID. 403. The considerations include unfair prejudice, confusing or misleading
the jury, and time or resource considerations. Id.
170. See Kaye, supra note 9, at 684 ("A convenient measure of probative value is the ratio of
the likelihoods for the two hypotheses."); Jonathan J. Koehler, When Do Courts Think Base Rate
Statistics Are Relevant?, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 373, 375 (2002) ('The ratio of these likelihoods
(known as the likelihood ratio) captures the probative value of the evidence.").
171. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 10, at 113-14 (explaining that evidence has a multitude
of possible likelihood ratios depending on which reference class is used).
172. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 277 (Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
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These conclusions depend on a number of further assumptions
(which may or may not be true). Even if the behavior is equally
common among both groups of children, it might nevertheless be
highly probative in a given case if, for example, abused children
exhibiting this behavior also possess, and nonabused children lack, an
additional characteristic and the particular child at issue possesses (or
lacks) this characteristic. Similarly, even if the behavior is one
thousand times more likely in abused children, the probative value
may nevertheless be minimal if the child possesses (or lacks) an
additional characteristic that places the child in the group of
nonabused children who exhibit the behavior. In these examples, the
evidence and the likelihood ratios remain constant, but the probative
value may vary dramatically. A fortiori, the probative value is not the
likelihood ratio.
This is a general problem affecting any type of legal evidence. A
previous article173 demonstrates its prevalence with regard to such
diverse issues as drug-smuggling data, 174 carpet fibers, 75 marital
infidelity, 76 and DNA random-match probabilities.17 7 For purposes of
this Article, the reference-class problem provides another reason why
the probabilistic conception fails the micro-level constraint.
This theoretical failure can be illustrated with another example
that focuses on practical issues raised by statistical evidence-the
famous Blue Cab example by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.178
Although they were not purporting to offer a theory of probative value
in law, their discussion is nevertheless instructive.
Cab: A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident, and two cab companies, Green and
Blue, operate in the city. The evidence: eighty-five percent of the cabs in the city are

173. Allen & Pardo, supra note 10, at 116-23.
174. See United States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085, 1090-92 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
statistical and economic analysis relating to drug trafficking generally did not qualify as "specific
evidence" of drug quantities that the defendant allegedly smuggled); United States v. Shonubi,
895 F. Supp. 460, 501-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (evaluating the admissibility of probabilistic evidence
at sentencing and holding that a combination of statistical and nonstatistical evidence was
sufficient to satisfy the government's burden of proof).
175. See Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, On the Probative Value of Evidence from a
Screening Search, 43 JURIMETRICS. J. 265, 266-70 (2003) (discussing the evidentiary challenges
of a community screening search based on a hypothetical carpet fiber found at a crime scene).
176. See Davis & Follette, supra note 123, at 137-39 (using base rates to demonstrate that
the fact of infidelity is not probative of whether a man murdered his wife).
177. See Nance & Morris, supra note 8, at 409, 419 (noting that jurors may not
appropriately evaluate the probative value of DNA evidence when given random-match
probabilities).
178. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153, 156-60 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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Green and fifteen percent are Blue. What is the probability the cab involved in the
179
accident was Blue?

The example is famous for illustrating "base-rate neglect."180
Decisionmakers typically ignore background base-rate statistics in
estimating probability, and this may lead to cognitive errors. For
example, if a witness says the cab was Blue, test subjects will credit
this testimony and ignore the distribution statistics (even when
subjects are told that the witness is only eighty percent likely to be
accurate).181 Tversky and Kahneman's path-breaking work drew
attention to this general cognitive issue. Base-rate neglect is no doubt
an important issue in the psychology of decisionmaking. 182 It is also a
mistake, however, to try to read off or quantify probative value from
any given reference class for which data are available-in other words,
to assume that the probative value just is the relevant statistics (0.85
and 0.15, in the example). 183 Why? To quantify probative value based
on these statistics would be a mistake because the distribution of cabs
in the city is just one class to which this event (this accident and this
cab) is a member. The event and the evidence are members of a
virtually infinite number of sets, each with differing rates. For
example, suppose that eighty-five percent of the cabs on the street are
Blue; eighty-five percent of the cabs running at that time of day are
Green; eighty-five percent of the cabs in the service area (which
includes several towns) are Blue, and so on. 184 Inferences from a
particular reference class involve a host of background assumptions
about the appropriateness and homogeneity of that particular class,
the likely distribution of other classes, and several other possible
issues. In sum, the data from one reference class cannot by themselves
serve as either a normative standard by which to quantify probative
value or as a theoretical explanation of the concept.185
179. Id. at 156-57.
180. Id. at 157-58.
181. Id. at 157-59.
182. For a recent discussion, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 166-74
(2011) (using the Blue Cab example and other experiments to explain base-rate neglect).
183. See Koehler, supra note 18, at 1300 n.69 ("Many scholars agree that the probative
value of statistical evidence can be represented in terms of a likelihood ratio.").
184. It is sometime suggested that we should rely on the smallest reference class available.
Notice, however, the smallest class is the event itself, which will have a probability of 1 or 0.
Beyond that, what matters is homogeneity among the class, not its size. In other words, a larger
class may be more reliable than a smaller class; without more information about the items in the
class, we cannot know one way or the other. These second-order doubts affect the probative value
of evidence.
185. This is not to suggest that we cannot make judgments about the value of evidence from
different reference classes. In a recent article, for example, Professor Edward Cheng
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B. The Macro-Level Constraint
The macro-level constraint requires that a theory ought to
explain when evidence is sufficient to satisfy standards of proof. A
successful theory will be able to explain these outcomes in light of
accuracy and allocation of the risk of error. It will also provide criteria
for guiding and evaluating applications of the standards.
A probabilistic conception of standards of proof is
commonplace. Scholars typically posit or presuppose that
preponderance of the evidence equals proof greater than 0.5; that clear
and convincing evidence equals greater than 0.75 or so; and that
beyond a reasonable doubt equals greater than 0.9 or higher. 86 Under
this conception, evidence is sufficient when the probability of the
proposition at issue exceeds the decision threshold. This conception is
relied on by both descriptive and normative theories, and, although it
captures some important aspects of proof standards,187 it is deeply
problematic. The problems for this conception concern considerations
of both accuracy and allocating the risk of error.
instructively explains how selection criteria for choosing among statistical models may provide a
practical way to evaluate legal evidence when the parties in a case each present statistical
evidence from different reference classes. Cheng, Practical Solution, supra note 100, at 20932101. The model selection criteria-he discusses primarily Akaike's Information Criterion
("AIC"), Hirotugu Akaike, A New Look at Statistical Model Identification, 19 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL 716 (1974)-provide a method for choosing among

dimensions of fit and complexity. See also Malcolm Forster & Elliott Sober, How to Tell When
Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions, 45 BRIT.
J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 1, 2-11 (1994) (discussing the basic premises of Akaike's theory); James
Franklin, Feature Selection Methods for Solving the Reference Class Problem: Comment on
Edward K. Cheng, "A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem," 110 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 12, 18-22 (2010) (providing a brief overview of statistical modeling and suggesting that
feature selection methods provide a better solution to the reference-class problem). Cheng's
interesting and sophisticated proposal, however, applies only to a limited domain of cases where:
(1) both sides offer statistical evidence; (2) the evidence depends on different reference classes;
and (3) the evidence is the primary evidence for each side on a contested material issue in the
case. More important for purposes of this Article, Cheng does not purport to offer a theory of, or
purport to quantify, probative value in this limited domain of cases, or more generally. As
discussed in Part III infra, the value of statistical evidence depends on explanatory criteria. The
reference-class problem is avoided under the explanatory conception because explanatory criteria
determine the value of evidence from different classes and probative value does not need to be
quantified.
186. See supra note 12.
187. Most importantly, it can be used to illustrate formally, given a number of assumptions,
the distribution of factual errors likely to follow from different standards of proof. See, e.g.,
Hamer, supra note 12, at 87-96 (proposing a mathematical function to estimate the expected
conviction error rate for a given standard of proof); Kaplow, supra note 15, at 757-72, 793, 805,
821-22 (discussing the interaction between standards of proof, conviction errors, and levels of
sanctions).
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1. Accuracy
Probabilistic theories fail to provide guidance in applying the
standards to achieve accuracy goals. They also lack criteria by which
to determine which applications are reasonable. To apply a
probabilistic standard, one must also quantify the evidence.188
Quantification could be done based on either "objective" data189 or
"subjective" beliefs. 190 Objective data (relative frequencies) do not exist
for most items of evidence in any given trial. 91 Thus, subjective
probability assessments provide the only plausible probabilistic
option. Unfortunately, subjective standards provide little guidance on
how to proceed. Suppose you are on a jury in a civil case applying the
preponderance standard, and you are trying to decide, after hearing a
number of witnesses, whether the probability of a proposition exceeds
0.5. How do you do this? Close your eyes and think of a number?
Suppose you conclude it is 0.6 likely and your fellow juror says it is 0.2
likely. Are both reasonable? Is 0.99? Is 0.01? How can we tell?
Subjective assessments could be anything at all, and there is simply
no reason to think they will be truth conducive. 192
A subjective conception also fails to provide a basis for
distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable applications. This
limitation affects not only applications by jurors at trial. It has
profound doctrinal implications. In civil cases, the standards for both
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law depend on
whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. 19 3 What
is reasonable or not depends on the burden of proof and the applicable
decision standard. Thus, decisions to grant or deny either motion

188. This could be done precisely or with vague judgments about whether evidence
surpasses a threshold.
189. But note that objective data would still be subject to the reference-class problem. See
supra notes 171-85 and accompanying text.
190. See Hajek, supra note 109, at 3.3 (explaining probability when conceived of as a
rational agent's degree of belief).
191. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 773-76 (discussing the practical difficulty of obtaining
relative-frequency evidence). Even if the data existed, the computational complexity may be too
great for most trials. See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L.
REV. 1047, 1054-55 (2011) (discussing near-infinite amount of complex factors in juridical factfinding); Callen, supra note 8, at 4.
192. The point is not just that jurors may disagree about exact numbers or thresholds; it is
that there could be any relationship at all (including a random one) between subjective beliefs
and truth. See LAUDAN, supra note 14, at 51-62 (arguing that standards of proof should instruct
jurors on what to believe based on the evidence, not instruct them to consult their existing
subjective beliefs after having heard the evidence).
193. See supra note 25.
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presuppose some conception of the proof standards and what they
require. Whether parties will get to trial in the first place, whether the
case will go to a jury, and whether a jury verdict will be overturned,
all depend on principled applications of standards of proof. But
subjective probabilistic standards provide no guidance. Suppose you
are a judge deciding a summary judgment motion and trying to
determine whether a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff under
a decision rule of "greater than 0.5 according to their subjective
beliefs." First, there is simply no way to know what any actual jury
would do without letting it decide. More importantly, because the
criteria are subjective, there is no independent basis for concluding
which applications are unreasonable.
This same limitation arises in criminal cases under the beyonda-reasonable-doubt standard. Challenges by defendants to the
sufficiency of the evidence before, during, and after trial depend on
whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.194 Thus, whether criminal defendants will go to trial, whether
cases will go to a jury, and whether convictions will be overturned
depend on principled applications of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard. Subjective standards, however, provide no guidance or
criteria for principled applications.
2. Risk of Error
Probabilistic conceptions suffer from additional limitations
regarding the risk of error. These standards are expressed as
noncomparative in a way that would frustrate, rather than explain,
standards of proof in light of their goals in allocating the risk of
error.195 Conventional probabilistic standards compare the probability
of a proposition with its negation, but they should be comparing the
competing propositions put forward by each side. Suppose the
preponderance rule is, as is commonly supposed, trying to minimize
errors and allocate the risk of error roughly evenly among plaintiffs
and defendants.196 Now, suppose a plaintiff offers a story that a
reasonable jury concludes is 0.4 likely and the defendant offers a story
194. See, e.g., Langston v. Smith, 630 F.3d 310, 316-20 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that evidence
was constitutionally insufficient to support conviction for felony assault); O'Laughlin v. O'Brien,
568 F.3d 287, 302-04 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that circumstantial evidence identifying defendant
as perpetrator of burglary and assault was insufficient to support conviction); supranote 25.
195. A similar problem would arise for noncomparative standards designed to achieve other
goals. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 15, at 752-72 (arguing that proof standards should create an
optimal deterrence/chilling effect).
196. See supra notes 74, 76.
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that the jury concludes is 0.2 likely. 197 The "greater than 0.5" standard
implies that the plaintiff should lose-even though the plaintiffs
account is twice as likely to be true as the defendant's alternative
account.198 This frustrates the goal of equalizing the risk of error;
plaintiffs should not bear the risk of error for all of the unknown
probability space. 199 The mistake is to assume that any unknown
possibilities favor the defendant (or the party without the burden of
proof). This is inconsistent with equalizing the risk of error.
This noncomparative conception may be compounded by two
additional issues, one empirical and the other theoretical. First, this
noncomparative aspect may be exacerbated if, as an empirical matter,
jurors employ a probabilistic threshold higher than the conventional
ones. In a recent study, for example, Eyal Zamir and Ilana Ritov
report that subjects (lawyers and students) employed a probabilistic
threshold of approximately 0.7 in applying the preponderance
standard. 200 Employing this threshold shifts more of the risk of error
onto plaintiffs (or parties with the burden of proof) and is inconsistent
with equalizing the risk of error. The second issue concerns theoretical
puzzles generated by the so-called "conjunction problem." 2 0 1 Because
the standard of proof applies to individual elements rather than cases
as a whole, this creates a variety of formal problems when conceived
197. There are other problems with this conception. For example, to truly prove a case
beyond 0.5 requires a plaintiff to disprove all the other ways the world could have been from
what the plaintiff alleges. Disproving all other possibilities, however, is an impossible task. See
DOUGLAS WALTON, ABDUCTIVE REASONING 122-28 (2004) (applying abductive reasoning to
evidence law).
198. Two recent probabilistic interpretations improve on this problem with the conventional
account. Professor Cheng rejects the "0.5" requirement and conceives of the standard as
comparing the probability of the plaintiffs case with the probability of the defense's alternative
account. Cheng, supra note 12, at 4-9. By contrast, Professor Clermont's recent proposal based
on fuzzy logic conceptualizes the standard as measuring belief in the truth of a proposition
compared with belief in the negation of the proposition (or that it is false), with a third category
for "unknown" belief. Clermont, supra note 39, at 54-59. These conceptions better fit with the
goal of equalizing the risk of error, but they also depend on the subjective beliefs of fact finders
and thus raise similar accuracy problems as with the conventional probabilistic conception. They
also do not appear to provide criteria for evaluating which applications are reasonable.
199. This also frustrates the goal of minimizing error; to achieve this goal the law should go
with the more likely account.
200. See Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in
Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 186-91 (2012) (determining that the actual standard of
persuasion required in civil disputes is nearly twenty points higher than .51).
201. See Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasionin Civil Cases:Algorithms
v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 897-904 (exploring jury instructions and jury
verdicts to determine if a conjunction problem actually exists); Saul Levmore, Conjunction and
Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 724-33 (2001) (discussing the "math-law divide" and
responses to the law's rejection of the product rule).
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probabilistically. For example, the plaintiff wins in a claim with two
elements by proving each to 0.6, even though the likelihood of the case
as a whole is 0.36 (assuming the elements are independent of each
other). If employed in such a manner, too much of the risk of error
would fall on defendants. If, by contrast, the probabilistic threshold of
0.5 applied to the case as a whole, then too much of the risk of error
may be shifted onto plaintiffs and may arbitrarily depend on the
number of formal elements used to specify a claim. 202 The extent to
which this issue may create any problems in actual cases is not
clear. 203 It arises as a theoretical matter as an implication of the
probabilistic conception of the proof process and is thus another strike
against this particular conception.
C. The Integration Constraint
The integration constraint requires that a theory's accounts of
the micro- and macro-levels cohere. This criterion is a problem for the
probabilistic conception for the following reason: macro-level proof
standards based on subjective probabilities (which are the only
plausible kind) are inconsistent with micro-level conceptions of
relevance and probative value in terms of objective probabilities
(which are the only plausible kind). This tension requires some
unpacking to make the inconsistency plain.
Begin with the micro-level. Relevance and probative value
depend on more than the subjective assessments of individual fact
finders.2 04 This point accords with conventional probabilistic
explanations of evidence at the micro-level: some evidence may be
relevant even if jurors believe it is irrelevant, and evidence may have
probative value that deviates from what particular jurors believe. For
example, in Liberal Candidates the evidence is irrelevant even if
particular jurors think it is incriminating evidence that supports the
prosecution. Indeed, this is why judges have authority to exclude
evidence. 205 And, at the macro-level, applications of the proof
standards are essentially assessments of the probative value of the
202. For example, in a claim with four independent elements, the plaintiff would have to
prove each element beyond 0.841.
203. This is so because jurors do not typically reason probabilistically in an element-byelement fashion. See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
204. If it did not, judges would have no basis to exclude evidence on grounds of relevance or
under FED. R. EVID. 403.
205. FED. R. EVID. 401-03. Note, however, that once evidence has been admitted it will
generally be up to individual jurors to decide for themselves whether evidence is relevant and its
probative value.
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evidence as a whole, which presupposes the possibility of a reasonable
or unreasonable application. For example, a plaintiffs evidence in a
civil case may be so weak that no reasonable jury could find in its
favor at trial or so weak that an appellate court should reverse a
judgment in the plaintiffs favor. Likewise, a criminal case may be so
weak that it should be dismissed before trial or a conviction
overturned on appeal following a guilty verdict by a particular jury.
Indeed, this is why judges have authority to issue summary
judgments and judgments as a matter of law in civil cases and to
dismiss criminal cases based on insufficient evidence. 206 So far, so
good.
Although the foregoing implies that there is more to the
probative value of evidence than subjective beliefs, subjective
probability standards at the macro-level deny this fact and are thus
inconsistent with the micro-level account. At the macro-level, whether
the evidence in a case is sufficient to satisfy a probabilistic proof
standard will depend simply on whether the particular fact finders
think that the evidence surpasses the threshold. The perceived
strength of the evidence may be quantified based on each juror's
"degree of belief' or "degree of confidence" in the truth of the disputed
facts, 207 but the inherent subjectivity remains. Moreover, the lack of
objective data for most items of evidence means that a switch to
"objective" probabilistic conceptions at the macro-level is not a feasible
alternative and cannot fill the gap. 208 Therefore, as a theoretical
matter, we have a contradiction. Something more-and more
plausible-is needed.
We can illustrate the problem from the opposite direction as
well. Begin now at the macro-level with proof standards based on
subjective assessments. According to this conception, there is nothing
more to the probative value of evidence beyond subjective
assessments. 209 But this is inconsistent with the idea that jurors could
206. See supranote 25.
207. See Hajek, supra note 109, at 3.3 (explaining that probabilities can be calculated based
on degrees of confidence, which leads to several interpretations of probability that vary by agent
and time).
208. Furthermore, if objective, relative-frequency data were available for each item of
evidence (and we knew the dependence relationships among these items), then there would be
only one reasonable answer, the objective one.
209. The elegance of subjective Bayesian "convergence" to agreement or to truth is lost in
typical litigation settings. See Goldman, supranote 14, at 240 n.10 ("It is doubtful ... that any of
these convergence results would apply to examples in the law because they only concern getting
truth 'in the limit,' and legal adjudication is presumably interested in the here and now, not 'the
limit.' "). The various convergence theorems depend on the notion that posterior probabilities
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be mistaken about relevance and probative value, and thus judges
would have no basis to exclude evidence on these grounds. And the
micro-level account denies these claims. To avoid a contradiction, a
subjectivist at the macro-level must concede that relevance and
probative value also depend solely on subjective assessments. 210 With
this concession, however, the theory fails as an explanation of
relevance and probative value as they currently operate, and it fails as
a normative account. Either way, the theory is in a bind: the only
plausible probabilistic conception for satisfying the macro-level
constraint is inconsistent with what is required to meet the micro-level
constraint.
III. AN EXPLANATORY CONCEPTION OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF
An alternative conception based on explanatory considerations
provides a superior theory of evidence and proof. This Part first
outlines the contours of this conception and then examines it in light
of the three theoretical constraints.
The alternative conception focuses on potential explanations of
the evidence and the disputed events. 211 Rather than examining
probabilistic relationships-either the probability of propositionsgiven
evidence, or the probability of evidence given propositions-the
explanatory conception examines whether particular explanations, if
true, would be better or worse at explaining the evidence and the

based on large amounts of data will converge and "wash out" subjective priors. See JOHN
EARMAN, BAYES OR BUST? 144-49 (1992) (discussing Bayesian convergence); cf. Kaplow, supra
note 15, at 773 n.62 (noting that consistency constraints on subjective beliefs will eventually
cause the beliefs to converge on a proof threshold).
210. Or this apparent inconsistency must be explained away. In other words, what is needed
is an explanation of why different probabilistic conceptions apply or ought to apply at each level.
211. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 14, at 225, 229-42 (discussing inference to the best
explanation). The explanatory conception relies on both the process of explanatory ("abductive")
reasoning and the products of that reasoning (i.e., explanations). For an overview of the
psychology of explanatory reasoning, see Tania Lombrozo, Explanationand Abductive Inference,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 260, 261, 263, 265-68, 270 (Keith J.
Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2012) (discussing the role of explanation in cognition,
everyday life, and learning). See also PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, How WE REASON 186-88 (2006)
(discussing the various roles of explanatory reasoning in daily life, law, and science).
Explanations concern epistemic relationships between propositions (the explanations) and what
they are meant to explain (e.g., other propositions, events, actions, or evidence). For an
illuminating philosophical analysis of these relationships, see PETER ACHINSTEIN, THE NATURE
OF EXPLANATION 74-102 (1983) (distinguishing explanations from sentences, propositions, and
arguments).
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underlying events than alternative explanations. 212 The inferential
process under this conception is "abductive" (or one of "inference to the
best explanation"). 213
This inferential process involves two aspects. First, potential
explanations are generated. The primary explanations at issue are
those provided by the parties; fact finders, however, may (but are not
required to) develop alternative explanations. Second, an explanation
is selected as best, or at least acceptable, depending on the decision
standard. Different standards of proof mean that the process is not
always inference to the best explanation; the acceptability of an
explanation for proof purposes shifts with the burden and standard of
proof. 2 14 Several criteria make an explanation better or worse than its
consistency, coverage,
alternatives. These criteria include:
completeness, simplicity, absence of gaps, coherence, consilience, and
fit with background knowledge. 215 However, there is no agreed-upon
212. Like the probabilistic conception, the explanatory conception is also ultimately
concerned with the likelihood or probability of contested propositions at trial. The primary
difference, however, is that the explanatory conception posits explanatory rather than explicitly
probabilistic criteria to guide inferences and to arrive at judgments about these propositions.
213. Abductive inferences or "inferences to the best explanation" feature prominently in
scientific (as well as everyday) reasoning. See PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST
EXPLANATION 55-70 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the "inferences to the best explanation" theory, its
advantages and disadvantages, and the ways in which evidence may be relevant to hypotheses);
WALTON, supra note 197, at 21-23 (reviewing the reasoning processes involved in an "inference
to the best explanation," and examining "abductive inferences"); Gilbert Harman, The Inference
to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REV. 88, 88-89 (1965) (asserting that the truth of an
explanation is inferred by rejecting the plausibility of alternative hypotheses). For numerous
examples of the roles played by explanatory considerations in science, see the answers provided
to Edge's 2012 annual question: "What is Your Favorite Deep, Elegant, or Beautiful
Explanation?" 2012: What Is Your FavoriteDeep, Elegant, or Beautiful Explanation, THE EDGE,
(last
http://edge.org/annual-question/what-is-your-favorite-deep-elegant-or-beautiful-explanation
visited Oct. 20, 2012). For a discussion of why objections to "inference to the best explanation" in
the philosophy of science do not carry over to law, see Pardo & Allen, supra note 14, at 242-45
(arguing that the scientific objections to "inference to the best explanation" don't apply to law
because the law deals with different questions and has different epistemic goals). Legal
reasoning and theorizing about doctrinal areas of law also involve "inference to the best
explanation." See Amalia Amaya, Legal Justification by Optimal Coherence, 24 RATIO JURIS 304,
306-10 (2011) (outlining the existing approaches to evidential reasoning); W. Bradley Wendel,
Explanation in Legal Scholarship: The Inferential Structure of Doctrinal Legal Analysis, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1036-40, 1055-73 (2011) (providing an overview of how doctrinal
analysis relies on inference to the best explanation).
214. See infra Part III.B.
215. These criteria provide norms for inference. See LIPTON, supra note 213, at 122-23
(discussing the relationship between inferential virtues and explanations). Although causal
considerations play an important role in assessing explanations, abductive reasoning involves a
distinct process from causal reasoning. Explanatory reasoning is broader and involves noncausal
considerations; moreover, not all causal hypotheses are explanatory. See Lombrozo, supra note
211, at 270-71 (distinguishing explanatory and causal reasoning). For this reason, the
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algorithm or method for combining or ranking the criteria as a general
matter. Rather, the salience and importance of each will depend on
details of the particular context and the inferential task at hand. 216
Once an explanation is selected, then verdicts proceed depending on
whether the selected explanation includes the elements of the claim,
crime, or affirmative defense. 217
The explanatory process overlaps to a significant extent with
the empirical Story Model of juror decisionmaking, 218 but there are
important differences. These differences shed light on the distinct
roles played by a theoretical project as compared with empirical
projects. Consider first the overlap. Many of the criteria that make a
story persuasive also make an explanation better, and vice versa. 219
This overlap is a theoretical virtue of the explanatory conception
because the theory coheres with the actual inferential operations at
trial in ways the classical probabilistic conception does not. The
overlap makes prescriptive or evaluative recommendations more
feasible because they arise from a conception that builds upon, rather
than one that is at odds with or alien to, the existing reasoning
processes of fact finders. 220
When the Story Model and the explanatory conception diverge,
however, the latter provides normative guidance. They diverge in
three crucial ways. First, explanations, unlike stories, may be quite
general. 22 1 Rather than the specific stories posited by the Story
explanatory conception is distinct from alternative probabilistic models that rely on causal
reasoning (most notably, Mill's). See LIPTON, supra note 213, at 124-28 (contrasting "inference to
the best explanation" and Mill's "Methods"); Stein, supra note 39, at 235-46 (articulating a
causative probability theory).
216. See Paul Thagard, Evaluating Explanations in Law, Science, and Everyday Life, 15
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 141, 144 (2006) (discussing the impact of emotional bias and
other circumstances on inferential criteria). Although the explanatory criteria must be applied
on a case-by-case basis to determine the quality of an explanation, that explanatory criteria
determine outcomes and the quality of explanations needed to satisfy evidentiary standards
remains constant among types of cases. The context dependence and lack of an algorithm for
assessing explanations may be a theoretical downside for the explanatory conception, but the
success of the conception in light of the three theoretical criteria nevertheless makes it superior
to the probabilistic conception (which fails all three). Moreover, as discussed below, the
explanatory conception allows for more objective assessments on a case-by-case basis than the
inherently subjective ones required by the probabilistic conception.
217. As an empirical matter, verdicts are determined by deducing whether chosen accounts
of what occurred include the elements or not, not by deciding serially (and inductively) among
the elements. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 17, at 520-29.
218. Id. at 520-21.
219. See id. at 527-29 (listing coverage, coherence, and uniqueness as primary
considerations for story persuasiveness and juror confidence).
220. See supra note 46.
221. For example, in a res ipsa loquiturtort case a general explanation may be sufficient.
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Model, 222 the generality of alternative explanations at trial will
depend on the substantive law and the ways in which the parties
attempt to prove their cases. Second, unlike integrated stories,
explanations may be disjunctive. 223 General or disjunctive
explanations may still be the best available explanation, and,
therefore, the results implied by the explanatory conception may
diverge from the Story Model or the decisionmaking of an actual jury.
Finally, although decisionmaking under the Story Model fits
reasonably well with the preponderance standard, it does not fit well
with higher proof standards. With higher standards, the explanatory
conception provides guidance and constraint in ways that may diverge
from the Story Model and the decisionmaking of actual jurors-and
that converge with the goals of the proof standards. This convergence
is a further theoretical virtue.
The discussion that follows articulates how the explanatory
conception fits with each constraint; explains how it overcomes
problems that beleaguer the probabilistic conception; and responds to
potential counterarguments.

222. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 17, at 552.
223. Parties may offer multiple stories consistent with the Story Model, but these stories
will typically work together as an explanation. See Reid Hastie, What's the Story?: Explanations
and Narratives in Civil Jury Decisions, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE 31-32 (B.H.
Bornstein et al. eds., 2008) (explaining that defendants typically offer two stories: "The story of
the defendant's activities and a second story to account for the events that led to the lawsuit.").

By contrast, the disjunctive explanations referred to above may also be alternatives that are
inconsistent with each other, rather than explanations of different aspects of the evidence and
events. For example, an explanation that "X, Y, or Z happened" may be sufficient if X, Y, and Z
all support the party offering this explanation, and this disjunctive explanation is itself better
than the alternative explanation (which may or may not itself be disjunctive). For cases that fit
this pattern of proof, see Zuchowitz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998), and Rhesa
Shipping Co. v. Edmunds, (1985) W.L.R. 948 (H.L. (E.)), reprinted in EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND

FACTS: A BOOK OF SOURCES 304 (Peter Murphy ed., 2003). See also Alex Stein, An Essay on
Uncertaintyand Fact-Findingin Civil Litigation, With Special Reference to Contract Cases, 48 U.
TORONTO L.J. 299 (1998) (analyzing Rhesa and defending a disjunctive explanation). Similarly, a

unified explanation may be better than a disjunctive series of known and unknown explanations.
See Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137 (N.Y. 1919) (holding that a reasonable jury could
find defendant's negligence caused plaintiffs illness without plaintiff needing to eliminate all
other causes). The disjunctive explanations referred to above and in the text arise within a
particular legal claim, not the aggregation of multiple legal claims. Whether parties should be
able to aggregate the likelihood of their multiple legal claims is outside the scope of this Article.
For an illuminating recent discussion of this issue, see Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation
and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2 (2012).
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A. The Micro-Level Constraint
Relevance and probative value depend on whether evidence
supports a party's explanation or is a challenge to the other side's
explanation. This conception avoids three problems with a
probabilistic conception of relevance and probative value: (1)
"overlapping" evidence that is relevant but does not distinguish
between the cases probabilistically; (2) relevant evidence that does not
coincide with increases (or decreases) in probability; and (3) the
reference-class problem.
First, the explanatory conception accounts for evidence that is
relevant but does not distinguish between cases. Evidence is relevant
if it is part of or supports one side's explanation (or challenges one
side's explanation), 224 regardless of whether it is also part of or
supports the other side's explanation. The probative value of evidence
depends on the role it plays in each side's explanation or in
distinguishing between them. 225 This conception accounts for the
examples presented in Part II of overlapping evidence-the case of
People v. Johnson and Twins:
People v. Johnson2 26 : The evidence about the package forms a critical part of the
explanations put forward by each side. For the prosecution, the evidence supports a
motive for the defendant to attack; for the defense, it supports an (understandable)
motive for the defendant to withhold the tray, which then provides a motive for the
guards to attack. The evidence provides a reason to believe each explanation. It is
relevant.
Twins 22 7 : The eyewitness testimony is relevant because it forms part of each side's
explanation of who committed the crime: the defendant or his twin. The testimony
provides information about the relevant events. It supports, or provides a reason to
believe, each explanation. It is relevant.

Second, the explanatory conception accounts for examples of
relevance that are not explained by the conventional probabilistic
conception. Evidence may support one side's explanation even when it
decreases the probability of that explanation, and evidence may not be
224. Evidence may provide a challenge to one side's explanation in a variety of ways.
Impeachment evidence is one example. Other examples include evidence that contradicts part of
the explanation, implies that part of the explanation is false, or suggests that for the explanation
to be true a number of extraordinary and implausible assumptions would need to be made.
225. Indisputable evidence on a material issue that is consistent with one side's explanation
and that could not possibly exist if the other side's explanation were true would be highly
probative. For example, indisputable evidence that a defendant was in another country at the
time of the crime will be highly probative if the prosecution's explanation of what occurred
requires the defendant's presence in the country.
226. See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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relevant to prove a proposition even when it increases its probability.
Part II presented the examples of Poison and Lottery to illustrate that
an increase in probability may be neither necessary nor sufficient for
epistemic relevance. The explanatory conception accounts for these
examples:
22 8
Poison : The second poisoning is part of the prosecution's explanation of what
occurred. Even if the evidence lowers the probability of poisoning from the probability
prior to its introduction, it nonetheless provides evidence that supports, or provides a
reason to believe, the prosecution's explanation. It is relevant.
229
Lottery : The
explanation that
Defendant is the
provides a reason

evidence about the nine hundred tickets supports Defendant's
Rival was the culprit. Even though it raises the probability that
culprit from the probability prior to its introduction, it supports, or
to believe, Defendant's explanation (Rival did it).

Finally, because the explanatory conception does not attempt
to quantify the probative value of evidence, it avoids the referenceclass problem. Probative value in every case depends on the
explanatory connections between the evidence and the alternative
explanations. Of course, data from different reference classes will have
different explanatory power, and explanations will do better or worse
at explaining data from different classes. But these considerations fit
naturally into the explanatory approach. The critical question-what
explains the evidence-isolates what is important about the evidence
and how it contributes to individual cases without the need to quantify
based on reference classes. In the Abuse example, the issue is what
best or better explains the child's behavior, and the statistical
evidence is relevant to answering this question. 230 Two other examples
where statistical evidence from particular reference classes may be
highly probative are (1) epidemiological evidence (which is statistical
in nature) comparing the incidence of disease among two groups to
prove causation, 231 and (2) statistics regarding an employer's hiring,
228. See supranote 154 and accompanying text.
229. See supranote 159 and accompanying text.
230. The distribution of cabs in the Blue Cabs example, see supra note 179 and
accompanying text, does not have this explanatory connection and, although relevant, it is thus
less probative than it would be were there such a connection. The primary conceptual difficulty
generated by the reference-class problem is that it undermines all attempts to quantify probative
value. This conceptual difficulty simply does not arise under the explanatory conception because
there is no claim that any particular class may be used to quantify probative value. See Allen &
Pardo, supra note 10; Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Probability, Explanation, and
Inference: A Reply, 11 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 307 (2007) (discussing the relationship
between the reference-class problem and inference to the best explanation).
231. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (analyzing proper
standard for admission of expert testimony). Even in this example, however, probative value
cannot be quantified and must somehow be integrated with other evidence. See Jennifer L.
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promotion, or firing practices to support a charge of discrimination. 232
There is nothing unique about statistical evidence-it can be
comfortably integrated into the explanatory conception, without the
need to quantify probative value and the conceptual difficulties
generated by the problem of reference classes that follows as a
result. 233
In addition to avoiding the conceptual difficulties underlying
the probabilistic conception, the explanatory conception also coheres
with the general concept of epistemic relevance. On the latter, recall
the previous quotations from Cohen: "[Rlelevance .. . is a relationtypically appreciated or pointed out in the course of a reasoned
enquiry, debate, conversation,
meditation, explanation, or
justification-between a true proposition and an askable question." 234
And, "[a]nything that can sanction a reason, even if an
incomplete or inconclusive reason, for accepting a particular type of
proposition as a correct answer, or for rejecting it as an incorrect
answer, to an askable type of question can count as a criterion of
relevance." 235
Evidence is relevant in the legal context if it provides a reason
for thinking a particular explanation is true or false. The askable
questions in this context include general questions like "what
happened?" and whatever specific questions are necessary for deciding
the elements of the claims, crimes, or defenses at issue. The
alternative explanations provide potential answers to those questions,
and evidence is relevant when it provides a reason to support or
challenge one of the explanations.
One might object, however, that the explanatory conception is
overinclusive. According to this potential counterargument, if evidence
can be relevant even when it does not distinguish the cases
Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship,and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009,
1022-23 (2008) (discussing the role of epidemiological and other evidence in the context of toxic
torts).
232. See Int'l Bros. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); see also Rachel
F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social Science, and the Law, 44 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 515, 543 (2010) (noting increasing resistance among courts to statistical evidence
in "disparate impact" cases).
233. This conception also explains the examples provided by Cheng. See Cheng, Practical
Solution, supra note 100, at 2102-03. For example, he argues that in a case about the disputed
value of a home, reference class data that included "age" and "number of bathrooms" would be
better than data that included only one or the other of these variables. Id. The house's age and
number of bathrooms together provide a better explanation of why it has the value that it does
than does an explanation that omitted one of these.
234. See Cohen, supra note 121, at 178.
235. See id. at 181.
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probabilistically, then does this mean that (all) irrelevant evidence
will also be counted as relevant? No. Parties still have to provide
reasons why the evidence supports their explanations (or reasons why
it challenges the other side's explanation). 236 The failure to satisfy this
requirement when faced with a relevance objection provides adequate
grounds for excluding evidence as irrelevant. 237 Relevance objections
ought to be sustained if either (1) the fact for which the evidence is
offered is not material (i.e., is not a "fact . .. of consequence") or (2) the

reasons given about the relationship between the evidence and the
explanation are either false or too speculative. 238 For example,
consider the Liberal Candidatesexample. 239 The evidence is irrelevant
because it does not provide any reasons for thinking the prosecution's
explanation (e.g., the defendant did it) provides a correct answer for
the question at issue (e.g., what happened?). To overcome relevance
objections, parties must provide plausible reasons as to why the
evidence supports or challenges one of the explanations. Evidence
supports or challenges an explanation when it provides a plausible
reason, even if it is a partial or incomplete one, for thinking the
explanation is true or false.
B. The Macro-Level Constraint
Standards of proof based on explanatory criteria avoid the
conceptual problems that arise for probabilistic standards. These
problems include failing to (1) fit the goals of the rules regarding
accuracy and the risk-of-error allocation and (2) provide criteria for
guiding and evaluating applications of the evidentiary rules consistent
with the goals.
Under an explanatory conception of the preponderance
standard, fact finders should infer the best-available explanation, and
the party with the burden of proof ought to win if that explanation
includes the formal elements. The party with the burden ought to lose
if the best-available explanation does not include one or more of the
elements. This conception of the standard instantiates the goals of
minimizing errors-to the extent better explanations are more likely
236. Under the probabilistic conception, parties must likewise offer theories of relevance
that explain the epistemic relationship between the evidence and the fact it is offered to prove.
237. FED. R. EVID. 402; see supra note 155.
238. FED. R. EVID. 401; see FED. R. EVID. 402. Sufficient uncertainty about whether a
reasonable relationship exists between the evidence and the explanations may be dealt with
through "conditional relevancy" rulings. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b); supranote 88.
239. See Lempert, supra note 9, at 1025.

604

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2:547

to be true 240-and equalizes the risk of error among the parties.
Because the standard is comparative, neither side benefits from the
unknown probability space. Each side bears the risk that the jury will
select an explanation favoring the other side, with ties going to the
party without the burden of proof.241
Under standards of proof higher than a preponderance of the
evidence, the quality of an explanation needed to satisfy the standard
rises accordingly. For the clear-and-convincing standard, the
explanation must be substantially better than the alternatives. For
beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard is whether there is a
plausible explanation that includes the formal elements and no
plausible explanation consistent with innocence (or that fails to
include one or more element). 242 Raising the quality of an explanation
needed to satisfy these standards will correspondingly shift the risk of
error consistent with the goals of the rules. 243 This is so because
whenever the standard is so raised, the party with the burden may
provide the better explanation and still lose. Parties with the burden
of proof thus bear an additional risk of error whenever their
explanations are better than the other side's but still not good enough
to satisfy the standard of proof.

240. Although better explanations are not guaranteed to be more likely true than worse
ones, the world does tend to work this way. At least it has so far. See infra notes 266-67 and
accompanying text.
241. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
242. This expression tracks the two conventional ways in which defendants can succeed at
trial: (1) demonstrating the prosecution's theory is implausible or (2) offering a reasonable
alternative consistent with innocence. See, e.g., O'Laughlin v. O'Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 304-08 (1st
Cir. 2009) (considering alternative explanations in evaluating evidential sufficiency); United
States v. Beard, 354 F.3d 691, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2004) (same); United States v. Newell, 239 F.3d
917, 920 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); see also Wilson v. Graetz, 608 F.3d 347, 352-53 (7th Cir. 2010)
(finding ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to offer an alternative
explanation); United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding it was abuse of
discretion by trial court in not granting defendant's request to compel discovery of evidence that
would support his "alternative explanation").
243. Although the standards are not as precise as probability thresholds, they may be better
understood by fact finders and may better fit with the reasoning processes of jurors. These
features may make explanation-based jury instructions more effective than current instructions.
For more on this issue, see Pardo, Second-Order, supra note 28. A recent empirical study
suggests that although the difference between the preponderance and the clear-and-convincing
standards has some effect on decisions, the distinction may not be well understood. See David L.
Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, Standardsof Proofin Civil Litigation: An Experiment from
Patent Law, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2110342. When the standards are characterized in explanatory terms, the difference is modest;
the higher standard should change the outcomes only in the class of cases where the jury
concludes that the choice between explanations is a close call or where they harbor sufficient
second-order doubt that the selected explanation is better.
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The explanatory conception also provides guidance for fact
finders and reviewing courts. There are objective ways to examine
explanatory relationships between evidence and competing
propositions. 244 In some cases there will be disagreement about which
explanation is better (or what makes an explanation better), but this
disagreement in some cases does not render the explanatory
framework as subjective or as problematic as one based on subjective
probabilities. The subjectivity problems inherent in the latter are
there in every case.245 By contrast, sometimes the objectively better
explanation will be clear, and sometimes not. 246 For example, suppose
an explanation (El) at trial could be true only if fact X were also true,
and fact X is known to be false; a second explanation (E2) that is
consistent with X being false and contains no similar problems would
be better than El. More generally, other things being equal, a
247
consistent explanation is better than a contradictory one ; an
explanation that accounts for more evidence and the most important
items of evidence 248 is better than one that cannot; and an explanation
that adheres with background knowledge and does not require
extraordinary assumptions is better than one that is inconsistent with
2 49
background knowledge and requires unrealistic assumptions. These
explanatory criteria connect with deeper doctrinal issues on the civil
25 0
and criminal sides: they provide criteria for evaluating applications.
244. See Clermont, supra note 20, at 482 ("[T]he law by its standard of proof seeks to force
the fact-finder, in the final decisional step, to link its inside mental state to the outside real
world.") Explanatory considerations force these mental states to connect with features of
evidence in the "outside real world." Some areas of law--e.g., employment discrimination and
antitrust-have developed doctrinal frameworks for evaluating competing explanations. See
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50 (2000); Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-95 (1986).
245. These problems are discussed in Part II.B supra.
246. This makes the explanatory conception better in some cases-and no worse in any
other cases-than the probabilistic conception on this point.
247. When there is an inconsistency between evidence and an explanation, fact finders will
need to reject either the evidence or the inconsistent explanation; the more credible the evidence,
the less plausible the inconsistent explanation becomes.
248. What is "important" will vary from case to case and among jurors in individual cases.
But, in general, the important evidence will include what the parties argue best supports their
explanations; the nonoverlapping evidence that distinguishes the parties' explanations; and any
evidence that, if true, shows that one of the proffered explanations is false.
249. Eliminating alternatives makes unlikely possibilities more plausible. See Anderson v.
Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[I]f in a particular case all the alternatives are ruled
out, we can be confident that the case presents one of those instances in which [a] rare event did
occur.").
250. They also provide a burden of explanation for parties and reviewing courts. Cf. Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 437 (2002) ("Neither the Court of Appeals, nor
respondents, nor the dissent provides any reason to question the city's theory. In particular, they
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We can illustrate these abstract considerations with a few
examples. In a case in which a plaintiff alleges age discrimination as
the reason for not hiring him, for example, the case will depend on the
plausibility of the age-discrimination explanation when compared
with the alternative(s) presented by the defendant (or constructed by
the fact finder).251 The comparative assessment may sometimes be
straightforward. The plaintiffs explanation will be worse-objectively
worse-than the defendant's if the defendant can produce uncontested
evidence that the defendant hired employees older and better qualified
than the plaintiff.2 5 2 Similarly, suppose a negligence case following a
traffic accident turns on whether a seatbelt was defective and failed
during the accident (plaintiffs explanation) or whether the driver
failed to wear the seatbelt in the first place (defendant's
explanation).25 3 The plaintiffs explanation will be better than the
defendant's if the plaintiffs injuries appear to be caused by wearing
the seatbelt for at least part of the accident ("seat belt burn") and
cannot be explained by other means. 254 In other cases, the comparative
assessment will be more difficult because of conflicting evidence or
because the determination depends on judgments of witness
credibility. In neither of these two examples, however, could one

do not offer a competing theory . . . ."). A court granting summary judgment or judgment as a
matter of law for a civil defendant, for example, ought to justify its decision by explaining why a
reasonable jury could not find the plaintiffs explanation of the evidence and events to be more
plausible than defendants. Similar considerations also structure the federal pleading regime. See
generally Pardo, Pleadings, supra note 28 (discussing pleadings after Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
251. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-49, 151 (2000)
(comparing age-discrimination explanation with alternatives in upholding verdict for plaintiff).
252. See, e.g., Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding summary
judgment for defendant when defendant presented evidence of hiring employees, for the same
job, who were older than plaintiff).
253. See Bammerlin v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1994)
(concluding evidence of seatbelt defect was sufficient to support a jury verdict for plaintiff).
254. Here is how Judge Easterbrook explained the matter in Bammerlin:
[Plaintiff] proceeded by eliminating the alternatives. We know that he wound up
outside the cab. How did he get there? Navistar's theory is that he was not wearing a
seat belt. Bammerlin countered with his say-so, plus a physician's testimony that
some of his injuries are more consistent with his wearing a belt than with the
hypothesis that he was not wearing one. ("Seat belt burn," the physician called it.) A
biomechanics expert added that the injuries are more consistent with Bammerlin's
being belted for part of the time during the crash.. ..
Bammerlin produced evidence that could lead a rational jury to eliminate the
hypotheses inconsistent with his favored theory, which in turn permits an inference
that his hypothesis is true.
Id..
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specify either the objective probabilities for each explanation or which
subjective probabilities are reasonable and unreasonable.
Moreover, even explanations that seem unlikely (or have low
probabilities in the abstract) will be better if the evidence eliminates
the other plausible alternatives. For an example, consider the case of
Anderson v. Griffin.255 The case involved a traffic accident that
resulted from the "driveline" breaking on a semi-tractor truck,
severing the connection between the truck's brake pedal and the
brakes. 256 The lawsuit involved a claim by a plaintiff who was driving
a car and was subsequently injured in the crash against a dealership
that performed service on the truck's driveline weeks before the
accident. 257 The plaintiffs explanation, supported by expert testimony,
was that the defendant negligently failed to repair the driveline. 258
The defendant's explanation, supported by expert testimony, was that
"road junk," or debris on the highway, was pulled up against the
driveline, causing it to break. 259 The defendant supported this
explanation with evidence that (1) the driveline was working properly
and appeared to be in good shape when it left the defendant's shop,
and (2) no work was performed on the particular area (the "slip yoke")
where the driveline broke during the accident. 260 If a fact finder
believes the defendant's evidence about the appearance of the truck
when it left the shop, then the road junk explanation is at least as
good as, if not better than, the plaintiffs negligence explanation, even
if the road junk explanation is, itself, unlikely. 261 As with the above
explanations, neither objective nor subjective probabilities provide
guidance or constraint in deciding which inferences are reasonable
and unreasonable.2 62
255. 397 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2005).
256. Id. at 517. The driveline "transmits power from the engine to the real axle." Id.
257. Id. at 517-18.
258. Id. at 518.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 517-18, 521.
261. In upholding a jury verdict for the defendant, Judge Posner explained that if the jury
believed the defendant's evidence, then:
[T]he likeliest alternative explanations for the accident are either that some deeply
hidden defect that [the defendant] could not have been expected to discover had
caused the accident or some external force, such as road debris somehow thrown
against the yolk by the motion of the truck; in neither event would [the defendant] be
liable.
Id. at 521-22.
262. Similar considerations apply to criminal cases. The higher standard of proof means
that the comparative assessment shifts-rather than a straight comparison, a conviction is
warranted when the prosecution's explanation is plausible (and includes the elements of the
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The normative guidance provided by the explanatory
conception also responds to potential empirical and theoretical
problems with current implementations of the rules. For example, if
fact finders employ a conception of the preponderance standard that
places too much of the risk of error on parties with the burden of
proof,263 then an instruction expressed in comparative, explanatory
terms may better align decisionmaking with an equality-based, riskof-error allocation. 264 Moreover, the explanatory standards resolve any
potential "conjunction" problems that may shift an unjustified risk of
error to one side or the other. 265 If fact finders first decide among
competing explanations (as dictated by the applicable standard of
proof), and then examine whether the selected explanation includes
the substantive elements, this decision procedure removes any
conjunction issues that may result as implications of an element-byelement decision process. The undesirable shifts implied by
conjunction under the probabilistic conception are avoided because
fact finders first select an explanation and then determine whether it
crime) and there is no plausible explanation consistent with innocence. The criteria for
evaluating the quality of an explanation remain the same, however. For an example in which a
conviction is not warranted under the explanatory conception, see O'Laughlin v. O'Brien, 568
F.3d 287 (1st Cir. 2009). The defendant was convicted of armed robbery and burglary; the victim
was severely beaten in her apartment and did not remember the attack or her attacker. The
prosecution's explanation was that the defendant, who was on the maintenance staff at the
victim's apartment complex, committed the crime to get money for crack cocaine. In concluding
that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, Judge Torruella noted that this
explanation was not plausible given the following evidence: (1) nothing was taken from the
victim's apartment, including jewelry in plain sight; (2) the injuries to the victim (an estimated
fifteen to twenty blows to her face and skull) were not consistent with someone motivated only by
money; and (3) "no physical or DNA evidence linked [the defendant] to the attack despite the
copious amount of blood at the crime scene." Id. at 302-04. For an example of a close case in
which a conviction is warranted under the explanatory conception, see United States v. Beard,
354 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2004). The prosecution's explanation that a gun carried during a drug
offense belonged to the defendant was sufficient when (1) the police witnessed the drug sale take
place, and (2) there was no other plausible alternative explanation as to how the loaded gun
ended up in the car with the defendant. Even though the defendant did not own the car, once it
was determined that the gun did not belong to the owner, the only plausible explanation was
that it belonged to the defendant. Id. at 692 ("No one supposes that the derringer was the
property of the car's owner . . . . It would mean that someone [else] who borrowed the car . . .
placed a loaded gun in the console, covered it with papers to conceal it, and then-what? Forgot
about it? That is possible, but it was not so lively a possibility to compel a reasonable jury to
acquit. . . .").
263. This problematic allocation may occur either because jurors employ a noncomparative
standard, see supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text, or because they employ a probabilistic
threshold that is higher than conventionally required by the standard, see Zamir & Ritov, supra
note 200.
264. See supra note 74.
265. See supra note 201.
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includes the formal elements, rather than deciding the elements
serially (which generates the paradoxes). Moreover, error allocation
under the explanatory conception matches the underlying goals of the
rules-the risk is roughly equal in cases under the preponderance
standard (the risk applies to the selection of contrasting explanations)
and shifts accordingly with higher standards of proof.
One might object to the explanatory conception at the macrolevel, however, by challenging the link between explanatory
considerations and truth. The explanatory conception depends on the
assumption that, other things being equal, a better explanation is
more likely to be true than a worse explanation. But, according to this
potential counterargument, the better explanations might be false.
That is true, but that fact does not undermine the explanatory
conception. The counterargument misses the mark because it relies on
the general "problem of induction."266 The "problem" arises because
any nondeductive inference (i.e., one in which the premises do not
entail the conclusion) may be false. This potential problem, however,
affects any theoretical account of legal proof, which by its nature
involves inductive inferences. 267 Explanatory considerations are not
guarantees of truth, but neither are any other criteria that could be
used to guide inferences in the context of legal proof (probabilistic or
otherwise). Moreover, within the domain of legal proof, there are no
other criteria by which to judge whether the better explanation is false
in a given case-no way to peer behind the explanations, as it were,
and to evaluate truth conduciveness directly. 268 Any considerations
that might bear on questions about the truth of explanations arise
within the explanatory framework. Reasons for thinking an otherwise
plausible explanation is unlikely are reasons for thinking it is not a
good or better explanation (depending on the alternatives).
266. DAVID HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 89 (1978) (originally published 1739-40);
see also John Vickers, The Problem of Induction, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edulentriesinduction-problem/(last visited Oct. 16, 2012) (describing
differing accounts of induction).
267. The more likely propositions expressed in probabilistic terms might also turn out to be
false. This is a consequence of the fact that both conceptions involve inductive inferences.
Inferences may be deductive (in which truth is guaranteed, if the premises are true) or inductive
inferences (in which truth is not guaranteed). Inductive inferences may be abductive, see supra
note 213, or enumerative (e.g., after observing ten white swans one may infer the eleventh will be
white or that all swans are white). The probabilistic conception relies on enumerative inferences
(or a "more of the same" principle), and the explanatory conception relies on abductive inferences
(or an "inference to the best explanation" principle). Both are inductive and thus subject to the
problem of induction.
268. Cf. Wendel, supra note 213, at 1074 ("IBE presents itself as a pretty good alternative to
doing without theories of explanation.").
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Considerations that make an explanation appear unlikely
ought to be incorporated into the explanation-evaluation process,
rather than used to trump that process. For example, if cognitive
psychology can identify distortions that occur as an empirical matter
in the evaluation of competing explanations, then these effects should
be taken into account when critically examining why one explanation
is thought to be better than another. 269 One possibility along these
lines concerns what Professor Dan Simon has called "coherence
shifts."2 7 0 When fact finders formulate a story of what happened, they
may overvalue evidence that supports their story and undervalue or
discount evidence that challenges it. If these shifts (or other types of
cognitive biases) occur, then this information should inform the
explanation-evaluation process, exposing situations where beliefs
deviate from what is epistemically warranted. 271
C. The Integration Constraint
The micro- and macro-levels cohere in a straightforward way,
and this consilience provides another theoretical virtue. 272
Explanations as a whole animate the macro-level, and the quality of a
macro-level explanation will depend on the relevance and probative
value of evidence at the micro-level. For example, an explanation that
is consistent with the evidence will be better than a contrasting
explanation that is inconsistent with the evidence. Likewise, relevance
269. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 18 (discussing cognitive biases and legal fact-finding); see
also, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012)
(describing how implicit bias may affect an array of decisionmaking tasks in criminal and civil
cases). Because the explanatory conception depends on relationships between explanations and
evidence that exist outside the mind of decisionmakers, it provides a more plausible epistemic
framework for correcting inferential mistakes due to cognitive biases; subjective probabilistic
judgments are more likely to simply replicate these biases. Normative assessments of
explanations should, of course, also take into account cognitive biases of judges. See Guthrie,
Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 16.
270. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 511 (2004) (discussing "coherence shifts" in which subjects
discount evidence that does not cohere with their accepted accounts and overvalue evidence that
does).
271. These issues should be evaluated from within the explanatory framework at least until
there is a better theoretical conception of evidence and proof within which to work. Nothing I
have argued for precludes this possibility. Some new theory may turn out to be superior in light
of the three theoretical criteria, or some new metatheory may be able to articulate better criteria
for evaluating evidence theory. But notice that it will do so by better explaining the proof process
or evidence theory than the current alternative explanations-precisely the methodology
inherent in the explanatory conception itself.
272. See supra notes 38, 85-87.
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and probative value at the micro-level will depend on whether the
evidence forms part of a party's explanation at the macro-level (or a
challenge to the other side's explanation), and the significance of the
evidence at the micro-level will depend on the significance of the
evidence to these macro-level explanations. Evidence that renders one
side's explanation plausible or the other side's explanation implausible
will be highly probative. For example, evidence that one would expect
to see if an explanation were true renders that explanation more
plausible, and evidence that requires the truth of several
extraordinary assumptions for both the evidence and an explanation
to be true renders that explanation less plausible.
Although the accounts at both levels are mutually reinforcing,
counterargument might contend that this interaction is
potential
a
problematically circular. The same explanatory considerations provide
guidance, constraint, and a basis for evaluation at both levels.
Therefore, so the counterargument would go, if the explanations
explain the evidence, on one hand, and the evidence gets its value
from the role it plays in supporting the explanations, on the other,
have we stumbled into a circle? Any apparent circularity here is
virtuous, not vicious. Trials are fundamentally about the alleged
events and circumstances that gave rise to litigation in the first place.
Proffered evidence is admitted to prove, test, or challenge the
competing explanations regarding these events and circumstances.
What makes evidence relevant, and what justifies a particular
explanation, is not the simple fact that the explanation may explain
the evidence; it is that the evidence combines with reasons for
thinking that a particular explanation is true or is better than the
alternatives.273
Given this relationship between evidence and competing
explanations, it should not be surprising that the micro- and macrolevels reinforce each other. The counterargument misses the mark
because judgments at the micro-level should inform and be informed
by the same considerations that will ultimately form macro-level
judgments. Any test that employed one set of considerations for
determining whether some condition has been met as a general matter
but employed entirely different considerations when testing for
whether specific instances of that condition obtain-without any
explanation of how the two sets of considerations related-would be a
273. For example, evidence that the defendant was out of the country when a crime was
committed makes "defendant did not commit the crime" a better explanation of what occurred
than "defendant is guilty" because the former explanation coheres with the reason "people can't
be in two places at once" and the latter explanation does not.
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pretty bad test. 274 The consilience of the explanatory conception on
this point is thus a theoretical virtue. What should be surprising is the
survival of the probabilistic conception despite its failure to cohere and
provide this kind of mutually reinforcing support.
CONCLUSION

The theoretical project of articulating an account of the
evidentiary proof process and its components has largely proceeded in
piecemeal fashion through the application of formal methods to
specific evidentiary or legal issues. There is, of course, nothing wrong
with this approach. Indeed, it may be a superior methodology for
making progress on specific issues-to the extent their domains can be
cabined and made tractable for formal applications. This Article,
however, stands for the idea that sometimes grand theoretical
ambitions have their place as well. Doing so allows for a broader
perspective on how the various issues and components hang together,
reveals flaws and limits of more local theorizing, and allows one to get
a grip on the various metatheoretical issues at stake in the
discussions.
This is the broad perspective taken up in this Article. In doing
so, we can draw some general conclusions: the nature of evidence
theory, whatever other features it possesses, necessarily includes
considerations of its epistemological core; the purpose of evidence
theory, whatever other purposes it serves, must be to provide or rely
upon a satisfactory account of this epistemological core in light of the
considerations of factual accuracy and allocating the risk of error. This
Article elaborated on this epistemological core and these
metatheoretical commitments by articulating three necessary
constraints on evidence theory (micro, macro, and integration), and
concluded that the explanatory conception meets them while the
probabilistic conception does not.
A final observation about the significance of evidence theory:
any application of evidence doctrine presupposes some conception of
the key evidentiary concepts. 275 The theoretical constraints identified
in Part I provide a check on whether any given explicit or implicit
274. For example, suppose we have a test that purports to assess mathematical ability, but
none of the specific questions actually measures mathematical ability.
275. The practical issues that presuppose these conceptions include: decisions to admit or to
exclude evidence, motions to dismiss, summary judgments, judgments as a matter of law,
motions for new trials, and challenges to sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases before,
during, and after trial and on appeal.
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conception makes sense in light of the underlying considerations of
accuracy and the risk of error. Issues of procedural justice and
constitutional and substantive rights all depend on sound applications
in the evidentiary proof process in light of these considerations. 2 76
Evidence theory provides a way to examine the soundness of these
applications. A theory that fails these constraints-as Part II
concluded with regard to the probabilistic conception-is not a theory
worth having. Given the significant issues at stake, a satisfactory
conception is needed. The explanatory conception provides the best
available conception in light of the theoretical criteria. This conclusion
demonstrates more generally that there is value in evidence theory, as
distinct from, but in tandem with, empirical and doctrinal
investigations of the evidentiary proof process.

276. See supra notes 22-28, 49-52 and accompanying text. Indeed, the political legitimacy of
law itself depends on adequate evidentiary procedures. See supra note 51.
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